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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The shores of the Great Lakes may look serene, but they are a battleground.  
Members of the public enjoy using the shores for fishing, boating, birding, or simply 
strolling along and taking in the scenic vistas.  Repeatedly, however, owners of land 
bordering the Great Lakes (i.e., littoral owners),1 armed with deeds indicating they 
own the shore to the water’s edge or even lower, have tried to stop members of the 
public from using their property above the water’s edge.  The right to exclude others 
from your property, the littoral owners argue, is one of the most important sticks in 
the bundle of property ownership rights and should be enforceable on the Great 
Lakes shores just as anywhere else.  Members of the public, on the other hand, claim 
that such shores are common to all and cannot be the exclusive domain of a private 
landowner.  Raising the “public trust doctrine” as a shield (or sword), these members 
of the public contend that the shores of the Great Lakes are held in trust by the state 
for use by the public, and therefore they have the right to walk along the shore above 
the water’s edge.   
Courts have been inconsistent, in approach and result, when determining the 
rights of the public to use the Great Lakes shores.  The Michigan Supreme Court, in 
a controversial 2005 decision, largely sided with the walking public.  In a 5-2 
decision, the state high court reversed an intermediate appeals court and held that, 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the public has a right to walk along the 
Michigan shores of the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark, even though 
the shore is privately owned.2  Ohio to date, however, has largely sided with the 
littoral owners.  An Ohio court of appeals in August 2009 ruled that the public trust 
stops at the water’s edge and that members of the public have no right to use 
privately owned Lake Erie shore above the water’s edge.3  In other Great Lakes 
states, the applicability of the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes shores, and the 
public’s right to use those shores, remain subjects of controversy and uncertainty.4   
In general, the public trust doctrine provides that, primarily in recognition of the 
importance of navigable waters to society, a state holds the navigable waters within 
its borders, and the lands underlying them, in trust for the benefit of the public to use 
for certain purposes.5  Despite its deep roots and wide acceptance, however, the 
public trust doctrine remains controversial and somewhat amorphous.  While some 
                                                                
1
 Land that borders a lake is known as “littoral property,” and the owners of such property 
have certain littoral rights.  See infra Part II.  These rights are roughly equivalent to riparian 
rights enjoyed by riparian owners of land that borders flowing waters such as rivers and 
streams.  JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1083 (4th ed. 2006). 
2
 Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 78 (Mich. 2005). 
3
 Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 
2591758 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 21, 2009), notices of appeal filed, No. 2009-1806 (Ohio Oct. 7, 
2009). 
4
 See infra Part III.  There are eight Great Lakes states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
5
 See, e.g., DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 17-18 
(2d ed. 1997); Stephen E. Roady, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 39, 41 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008). 
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champion the public trust doctrine as a vital guarantee of the public’s rights to use 
important natural resources,6 others urge that the doctrine is an ill-defined excuse for 
activist judges to override the actions of legislatures and to take private property 
rights without just compensation.7  Of particular relevance here is the considerable 
disagreement regarding the proper scope and effect of the public trust doctrine.8   
This Article does not try to resolve every nuance of the public trust doctrine.  
Rather, it tries to sort through the cacophony of cases and commentary to identify 
core principles of the public trust doctrine relevant to the Great Lakes shores and to 
offer guidance regarding the public’s right to use the shores of the Great Lakes, in 
relation to the rights and duties of littoral owners and the states.  While 
acknowledging that ultimately the public trust doctrine may vary from state to state, 
this Article proposes a uniform legal framework for use by each Great Lakes state 
for ascertaining the proper scope and effect of the public trust doctrine relating to the 
shores of the Great Lakes.  Although the Article uses the public’s right to walk the 
shores as a focal point for analysis, the proper scope and effect of the public trust 
doctrine along the Great Lakes shores has importance far beyond beachwalking.  At 
stake are thousands of miles of shore properties and their future uses (e.g., 
development of an economically valuable parcel, preservation of an ecologically rich 
beach).9   
Part II of this Article sets the stage by discussing the public trust doctrine and 
other legal principles relevant to the Great Lakes shores.  Part III explores how the 
Michigan and Ohio courts have grappled with whether, and to what extent, the public 
has a right to walk along the Great Lakes shores by virtue of the public trust doctrine, 
yielding widely divergent results.  In Part IV, the Article proposes a uniform legal 
framework, grounded in the core principles of the public trust doctrine, for use in all 
Great Lakes jurisdictions to ascertain the public’s rights to use the Great Lakes 
shores pursuant to the public trust doctrine.  Specifically, the proposed framework 
provides a principled approach for determining the geographic scope of the public 
trust doctrine and the uses protected by the doctrine.  Regarding the geographic 
scope, this Article invokes the equal footing doctrine to argue that each state should 
begin its analysis from a common starting point.  Further, notwithstanding Supreme 
Court language saying each state can define the limits of the lands it holds in trust, 
the power of the states to do so should be limited by the public trust doctrine itself.  
Regarding uses protected by the public trust doctrine, this Article proposes criteria 
that allow a state to recognize protected uses beyond the traditional, but only where 
the uses are important to society and do not unreasonably intrude upon the rights of 
                                                                
6
 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klaas, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 
(1970). 
7
 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 567 (1989) [hereinafter, Huffman, Out of 
Water]; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction 
& Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 48, 54-58 (2006). 
8
 See Roady, supra note 5, at 42. 
9
 There are more than 10,000 miles of Great Lakes shoreline in the eight Great Lakes 
states.  SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
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the littoral owners.  Part V examines how the proposed framework could be applied 
in each of the Great Lakes states, consistent with the existing authorities in those 
states, to bring much-needed predictability to the public’s right to use the Great 
Lakes shores. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The public trust doctrine has ancient roots.  The Romans’ codification of law, the 
Institutes of Justinian, recognized the public nature of rivers, the sea, and its shores: 
“By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”10   
English common law similarly recognized the importance of maintaining 
navigable waters and the lands underlying them for common use.  Control over 
navigable waters and the lands underlying them was considered an essential element 
of sovereignty, and therefore lands underlying navigable waters were owned by the 
crown in trust for use by the people.  Both private, jus privatum, and public, jus 
publicum, interests were recognized in the lands underlying navigable waters.  While 
legal title to the lands under navigable waters (jus privatum) could be transferred by 
the crown to a private party, the crown would continue to hold the public’s interest in 
using the lands (jus publicum) in trust for the people.  Thus, notwithstanding private 
ownership of lands underlying navigable waters, the government retained its trust 
obligation, and the public would continue to have the rights to make use of navigable 
waters and underlying lands.11   
The United States inherited the public trust doctrine from English common law.  
A series of nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court cases made clear that the states 
owned the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for their people to use.12  Public 
                                                                
10
 INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 2.1.1, at 90 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1922).  
Some scholars suggest that this statement was more aspirational than descriptive and that 
grants of land under navigable waters by the Roman government to private owners were not 
unknown.  See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing 
and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 9 & n.16 (1997).   
11
 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1894) (explaining English common law).  
The most influential discussion of the public trust doctrine in English common law was Lord 
Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s De Jure Maris.  Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, in A 
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370-413 (Stuart A. Moore ed., 
3d ed. 1888).  While Hale’s treatise arguably may not have accurately reflected the English 
common law when it was written in the 17th Century, see Rasband, supra note 10, at 13-15, 
there is no question that it reflected the common law of England as of the early 19th Century 
and was extremely influential in shaping early American law.  Id.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the history of the public trust doctrine, see Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, 
and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976). 
12
 See Shively, 152 U.S. 1; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 
(1842).  Although actually navigable waters in England essentially were equivalent to waters 
subject to the ebb and flow of tides, in the United States many non-tidal rivers and lakes were 
actually navigable.  Due to the importance of these non-tidal navigable waters in our new 
nation, the Supreme Court recognized that the reach of the public trust doctrine in the United 
States extended to non-tidal navigable waters as well.  See Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 
324, 337-38 (1876); see also Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/3
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use of navigable waters was deemed too important to be subject to private 
interference.13  While a state could transfer title (jus privatum) of lands underlying 
navigable waters to a private party, the underlying lands nevertheless remained 
subject to the public’s rights to use the waters and underlying land (jus publicum) 
held by the state.14   
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois15  
is often referred to as the “lodestar” of American public trust law.16  In 1869, the 
Illinois legislature sold more than one thousand acres of lands underlying Lake 
Michigan along the Chicago waterfront in fee to the Illinois Central Railroad for 
development purposes.  Four years later, the legislature repealed the grant and sought 
to have the original grant declared invalid.  The Supreme Court invoked the public 
trust doctrine to invalidate the original legislative grant.  While noting that the public 
trust doctrine in England was limited to waters affected by the tides, since non-tidal 
rivers and lakes there were not actually navigable, the Court held that the public trust 
doctrine in the United States equally applies to the lands underlying the Great 
Lakes.17  The Court ruled that the state not only held title to the lands under Lake 
Michigan in a proprietary capacity, but also in a sovereign capacity in trust for the 
people of the state to use for purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing.  In light 
of the trust obligation, the State of Illinois was not permitted to alienate the lands in a 
manner that did not preserve the waters for the use of the public.  Because the grant 
to the railroad effectively would have placed a vast, key swath of Lake Michigan 
under private control and prevented the public from using it for navigation, fishing, 
and commerce, the Court struck the grant as violating the public trust doctrine.18   
The public trust doctrine is now entrenched in American jurisprudence.  The 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its vitality,19 and the public trust doctrine has been 
                                                          
(1851) (deviating from English rule to hold that federal court admiralty jurisdiction under the 
Constitution is not limited to tidal waters). 
13
 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 436.  Part of the impetus for 
recognition of the public trust doctrine also was that lands underlying waters cannot be 
cultivated or improved like uplands.  See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.  Some have argued that the 
public trust doctrine has origins in natural law.  See George P Smith II & Michael W. 
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).  
14
 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 12-13; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458. 
15
 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. 387. 
16
 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640 (1986); Sax, 
supra note 6, at 489. 
17
 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-37.  The Great Lakes are not appreciably affected by the ebb 
and flow of tides.  Id. at 435-36. 
18
 Id. at 452-53.  For an in-depth factual and historical discussion of Illinois Central, see 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: 
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).   
19
 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
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recognized across the nation, including in all of the Great Lakes states.20  Historically 
a common law doctrine, the public trust doctrine can differ somewhat from state to 
state.21  But at its core, the public trust doctrine teaches that each state holds the 
navigable waters and lands underlying them in trust for use by the public for certain 
protected uses, traditionally navigation, fishing, and commerce.22  Not only does the 
public trust doctrine afford certain rights to the public, it imposes certain 
responsibilities on the state to protect the public’s rights to use those waters and 
underlying lands.23  The public trust doctrine can be employed to invalidate or stop 
both governmental and private actions that violate the doctrine.24   
Despite its long history and wide acceptance, the public trust doctrine remains 
controversial and less than sharply defined,25 and it has spawned an immense amount 
of commentary.26  Some commentators have focused on the source of the judiciary’s 
power to overturn the legislature’s grant in Illinois Central.  The Supreme Court in a 
later opinion stated that the public trust doctrine articulated in Illinois Central was 
based on Illinois law.27  But some commentators, perhaps noting the relative paucity 
of Illinois law cited in Justice Field’s opinion and recognizing that state common law 
may not be a sound foundation for a doctrine that allows the judiciary to override the 
acts of a legislature, have differed widely in their efforts to explain the source of the 
public trust doctrine as articulated in Illinois Central.28   
                                                                
20
 SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; Roady, supra note 5, at 41.  See infra Part V for 
discussion of the public trust doctrine in the eight Great Lakes states.  
21
 SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; Roady, supra note 5, at 41-42.  See also Robin Kundis 
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrine: Classifications of States, 
Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (state-by-state 
summary of the public trust doctrine in the Eastern United States).  
22
 SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 17-18; Roady, supra note 5, at 41. 
23
 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-53; SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 590. 
24
 SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 590; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 645-46. 
25
 See, e.g., Roady, supra note 5, at 39 (“The Public Trust Doctrine is controversial, and its 
contours are not sharply defined.”); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public 
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 
426 (1989) (“[T]he public trust doctrine is one of the most controversial developments in 
modern American law, and perhaps the single most controversial development in natural 
resources law.”). 
26
 The volume of scholarly literature on the public trust doctrine was described as “vast” 
more than a decade ago, Rasband, supra note 10, at 3 n.2, and one commentator counted more 
than 1700 articles since 1990 that make reference to the public trust doctrine.  James L. 
Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truth—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 13 n.59 (2007). 
27
 Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). 
28
 Some have argued that the doctrine is rooted in the U.S. Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 449-50 (Commerce Clause); Richard A. Epstein, The Public 
Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).  Others 
have suggested that Illinois Central was the product of federal common law, see Rasband, 
supra note 10, at 65, which presumably should relegate the doctrine to the legal scrap heap 
post-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rejecting federal common law as a 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/3
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Substantial commentary also has focused on advocating, or criticizing, expansion 
of the public trust doctrine beyond its roots in navigable waters and underlying lands.  
Professor Joseph Sax in 1970 published an influential law review article that urged a 
more robust use of the public trust doctrine to preserve natural resources beyond 
navigable waters and submerged lands.29  Subsequently, an expansive public trust 
doctrine has been championed by some as an effective tool to rein in the government 
and private developers, to protect the environment, and to ensure public access.30   
On the other hand, some commentators have criticized the public trust doctrine, 
claiming that it is an ill-defined excuse for judges to override the decisions of elected 
legislatures and to trample and take private property rights without due compensation 
to the owners, either by restricting the owners’ ability to use their property or by 
forcing them to allow the public to use their property.31  The U.S. Constitution 
prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just 
compensation to the owner.32  The public trust doctrine can be an effective bar to a 
taking claim.  For example, if the government were to require a private property 
owner to open her property for use by the public, the property owner could claim that 
her property (e.g., her right to exclusive use of her property) has been taken by the 
government for public use and demand compensation.  However, if her property 
were subject to the public trust doctrine, the public would have a right to use her 
property for at least certain protected uses (e.g., fishing).  The government could 
successfully defend against a taking claim by arguing that she only held the jus 
privatum and the government still retained the jus publicum, and therefore allowing 
the public to fish on her property did not constitute a taking because there had been 
no change in her property rights.33   
                                                          
basis to decide state law claims in federal courts).  Still others have argued that, regardless of 
its original provenance, the public trust doctrine has been enshrined in many state 
constitutions.  See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: 
Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a 
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 438-51 (1997); Klaas, supra note 6, 
at 714-19. 
29
 Sax, supra note 6.  In short, Professor Sax advocated using the doctrine to allow citizens 
to gain access to courts, where the judiciary could enforce public trust rights against the 
government and private parties to protect natural resources.  As Professor Sax observed, “Of 
all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the 
breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for 
citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management 
problems.”  Id. at 474. 
30
 See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial 
Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 311, 367-78 (1988); Klaas, supra note 6. 
31
 See, e.g., Huffman, Out of Water, supra note 7, at 567; see also Thompson, supra note 
7, at 54-58 (articulating conservative worries). 
32
 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
33
 See James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public 
Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines At Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
171 (1987) [hereinafter, Huffman, Takings Clause]; Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and 
Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005). 
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Some jurisdictions have interpreted the public trust doctrine somewhat more 
expansively in recent decades.  But even these most expansive and controversial 
applications of the public trust doctrine have not strayed too far from navigable 
waters and the lands beneath them.34   
While much has been written about the public trust doctrine generally, and the 
propriety of expanding it beyond navigable waters and underlying lands in particular, 
less attention has been paid to defining the proper scope and effect of the public trust 
doctrine as applied to its more traditional milieu of navigable waters and underlying 
lands—e.g., where do underlying lands end and uplands begin; what uses are 
protected by the doctrine?35  Resolution of these issues along the Great Lakes shores 
                                                          
Illustrative of concern about the public trust doctrine, and its effect upon private property 
rights and takings, is the brouhaha that led to a recent amendment of the Ohio Constitution.  
Opponents of ratification of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact, designed to protect against diversion of Great Lakes waters out of the Great Lakes 
basin and to promote wiser use of water resources within the basin, claimed that passage of the 
Compact would extend the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters and groundwater in 
Ohio, thereby jeopardizing private property rights in such waters.  As a result of negotiations 
that allowed the Ohio legislature to ratify the Compact, a proposed constitutional amendment 
was added to the ballot in November 2008 that specified, inter alia, that landowners have 
property rights in non-navigable waters and groundwater in Ohio and that such waters are not 
subject to the public trust doctrine.  S.J. Res. 8, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).  
The amendment passed by a landslide and took effect Dec. 1, 2008.  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19b. 
34
 Among the most controversial and expansive applications of the public trust doctrine in 
recent decades are those in California and New Jersey.  The California Supreme Court 
invoked the doctrine to protect non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, adversely 
impacting holders of rights to appropriate waters from those tributaries.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y 
v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).  The New Jersey Supreme Court held, in reliance 
on the doctrine, that the public had rights to use privately owned, dry sand ocean beaches 
above the high water mark.  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 
1984).  See also In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409 
(Haw. 2000) (applying public trust doctrine to groundwater connected to surface waters). 
35
 This is not to say that books and articles have completely ignored these issues.  Among 
those that address the geographic scope of, and uses protected by, the public trust doctrine, 
albeit not with a focus on the Great Lakes, is SLADE ET AL., supra note 5. 
Additionally, in the aftermath of the Michigan Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Glass v. 
Goeckel, a number of articles addressed the public’s right to walk along the shores of the 
Great Lakes, though primarily from a Michigan law perspective.  See, e.g., Jonathan Burleigh, 
Note, Don’t Fence Me Out: What Are the Rights and Responsibilities of the Public and 
Riparian Landowners After Glass v. Goeckel?, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 499 (2007); Eric 
Nelson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes: Glass v. Goeckel, 11 ALBANY L. 
ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 131 (2006); Carl Shadi Paganelli, Note, Creative Judicial 
Misunderstanding: Misapplication of the Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1095 (2007); Nathan Piwowarski, Comment, Trouble at the Water’s Edge: Michigan 
Should Not Extend the Public Trust Doctrine of the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1045 
(2006).  One exception is Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of 
Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (2007), in which Professor Abrams primarily argues that the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision is correct based on the history of the public trust doctrine 
but also mentions that it is consonant with the law in other Great Lakes states.  See also 
Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged 
Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907 (2007) (explores the public 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/3
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will be the emphases of the remainder of this Article.  Preliminarily, however, a brief 
discussion of some other legal principles relevant to the shores of the Great Lakes 
should help provide context for our evaluation of the scope and effect of the public 
trust doctrine.   
In general, as will be discussed in more detail below, states own the beds of the 
Great Lakes,36 and private parties often own the littoral lands bordering the lakes.37  
The boundary for title purposes between privately owned littoral lands and state-
owned beds often is defined as the “ordinary high water mark” along the shore,38 but 
depending upon the state and the parcel in question, the boundary may be defined 
differently (e.g., low water mark, water’s edge).39   
The levels of the Great Lakes are not appreciably affected by the tides, but rather 
rise and fall seasonally during the year.40  The highest levels typically occur in the 
summer, with the lowest levels in the winter; the average difference in lake levels 
between summer and winter each year is about twelve to eighteen inches.41  
Primarily due to changes in annual weather conditions, the levels of the Great Lakes 
also vary year to year; for example, the average levels of the lakes one year may be a 
foot higher or lower than the average levels the next year.42  As a result, the high 
                                                          
trust doctrine in the Great Lakes states more generally, and argues for a geographic scope 
including streams capable of recreational boating and for more protected uses); Diana V. Pratt, 
The Legal Rights of the Public in the Foreshores of the Great Lakes, 10 MICH. REAL PROP. 
REV. 237 (1983) (a brief, early exploration of the public’s rights to use the Great Lakes 
shores).   
36
 See infra Part V. 
37
 The vast majority of lands bordering the Great Lakes are privately owned.  SLADE ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 2 (ninety percent of all land in the United States bordering oceans and 
Great Lakes is privately owned).  
38
 “Ordinary high water mark” is discussed in more detail in Part IV.A.1.a infra.  In short, 
for purposes of the Great Lakes, the ordinary high water mark is the highest point on the shore 
where the water periodically stands and leaves a mark, not the highest point the water reaches 
during extraordinary events such as floods or severe storms.  
39
 See infra Parts III-V.  In short, the low water mark is the lowest point on the shore 
where the water periodically stands.  The water’s edge has been interpreted to mean the point 
on the shore where the water currently stands. 
40
 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-36; Glass, 703 N.W.2d 58, 98-99 (Markman, J., 
dissenting). 
41
 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES COMM’N, LIVING WITH THE LAKES 16 
(1999). 
42
 See NOAA GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, WATER LEVELS OF 
THE GREAT LAKES (Jan. 2009).  The annual average lake levels over the past century vary less 
than two feet from highest to lowest.  Id.  Short-term fluctuations in lake levels can be more 
extreme than monthly or annual averages.  Over the past century, the range from extreme high 
to extreme low water levels has been nearly four feet for Lake Superior and more than six feet 
for the other Great Lakes.  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES COMM’N, supra note 
41, at 17.  
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water mark, low water mark, and water’s edge are not permanent locations on the 
shore, but rather may move landward or lakeward.43   
At common law, the general rule is that gradual and imperceptible changes to the 
shoreline result in the boundary moving with those changes.44  That is, the boundary 
is a movable freehold.  Certain changes benefit the state and move the boundary 
landward: erosion is the gradual process of material being eroded from the shore, 
causing the shoreline to recede and water to invade the former upland, and 
submergence is the gradual disappearance of upland due to rising water.  Other 
changes benefit the littoral owner and move the boundary lakeward: reliction (land 
that was once submerged becomes exposed through the gradual recession of water) 
and accretion (uplands enlarge through the gradual deposit of material by the water).  
By contrast, sudden changes in the shoreline (e.g., due to a major storm) are 
considered avulsion, and the property boundary does not move with such avulsive 
changes.45  In general, a littoral owner cannot benefit from her own acts that result in 
artificial changes to the shoreline.46   
Although littoral owners typically do not own into the beds of the Great Lakes, 
they enjoy common law rights or privileges beyond those of the general public.  
These littoral rights typically include the right to access the lake, the right to wharf 
out to deeper water in order to use the lake for navigation, and the right to make 
reasonable use of the water.  These rights are not absolute, however, and are subject 
to regulation, the rights of other littoral owners and the public, and they cannot 
interfere with navigation.47   
                                                                
43
 Some states have defined the ordinary high water mark (“OHWM”), at least for certain 
purposes, as a specific elevation.  For example, Indiana has administratively defined the 
OHWM for Lake Michigan to be 581.5 feet, International Great Lakes Datum 1985.  While 
the OHWM in Indiana stays constant vertically, the location of the OHWM on the shore may 
horizontally change landward or lakeward due to physical changes to the shoreline caused by 
erosion or accretion.  Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., Lake Michigan: Ordinary High Watermark, 
available at http://www.in.gov/dnr/water/3658.htm (last visited May 27, 2010).  International 
Great Lakes Datum (IGLD) is a reference system by which Great Lakes water levels are 
measured.  The most recent is IGLD 1985.  Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., Lake Michigan: 
International Great Lakes Datum, available at http://www.in.gov/dnr/water/3659.htm (last 
visited May 27, 2010).   
44
 SAX ET AL.,  supra note 1, at 535. 
45
 BRUCE FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND BOUNDARIES ADJACENT 
TO TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS §§ 3.11, 3.12 (2002); SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 535-36; 
Abrams, supra note 35, at 898-902. 
46
 FLUSHMAN, supra note 45,  at § 3.12.2; SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 110. 
47
 SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.  An alleged taking of littoral rights is the focus of a case 
currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Stop the Beach Nourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 08-1151 (U.S., argued Dec. 2, 2009), a group of Florida 
beachfront property owners are claiming that a state beach restoration statute 
unconstitutionally took without compensation their littoral right to have their properties 
contact the ocean water, and alternatively that the state supreme court engaged in a “judicial 
taking” by holding that such contact is not a constitutionally protected littoral right.  See Save 
Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2006 WL 1112700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Nourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102 
(Fla. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2792 (June 15, 2009).   
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III.  RECENT CASES ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEM 
At one level, the application of the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes and its 
underlying lands is non-controversial.  As early as Illinois Central, the Supreme 
Court expressly held that the public trust doctrine applies to the Great Lakes and the 
lands underlying them.48  But as recent cases in Michigan and Ohio show, there is 
much controversy and uncertainty about whether, and to what extent and effect, the 
public trust doctrine applies to the shores of the Great Lakes.   
A.  Michigan 
Michigan was the first Great Lakes state to squarely decide whether the public 
has a right to walk along the shores of the Great Lakes.  The Michigan Supreme 
Court in Glass v. Goeckel49 ruled in 2005 that the public trust protects the right of the 
public to walk on even privately owned property along the Great Lakes above the 
water’s edge up to the ordinary high water mark.   
Glass v. Goeckel began as a local dispute between neighbors and metastasized 
into a battle between private property rights groups and public interest organizations 
over Michigan’s three thousand miles of Great Lakes shores.50  Although the suit 
originally was commenced by plaintiff Glass to enforce an express easement 
elsewhere on Goeckel’s lakefront property,51 at issue on appeal was Goeckel’s claim 
that Glass was trespassing on Goeckel’s private property by walking laterally along 
the Lake Huron shore near but above the water’s edge.52  The State of Michigan 
owns the bed of Lake Huron, as it does the beds of all of the Great Lakes within its 
borders.53  But for purposes of this appeal, it was undisputed that Goeckel’s title to 
the property extended at least to the water’s edge and that Glass was walking as a 
member of the public on Goeckel’s property between the water’s edge and the 
ordinary high water mark.54  The Michigan court of appeals ruled in favor of 
defendant Goeckel, holding that the public trust was limited to submerged lands, as 
evaluated moment to moment; that the littoral owner held exclusive use of the shore 
                                                                
48
 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892). 
49
 Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005). 
50
 Amici curiae in the case included the Michigan Land Use Institute, Defenders of 
Property Rights, Save Our Shoreline, Great Lakes Coalition, Inc., Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation, Michigan 
Bankers Association, Michigan Hotel, Motel and Resort Association, Tip of the Mitt 
Watershed Council, National Wildlife Federation, Michigan United Conservation Clubs, and 
various members of the Michigan legislature, as well as the Michigan Departments of 
Environmental Quality and Natural Resources.  Id. at 60-61. 
51
 Id. at 63. 
52
 Id. 
53
 See, e.g., Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51 
(Mich. 1926). 
54
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 61-63. 
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above the water’s edge; and that neither Glass nor any other member of the public 
had a right to traverse the shore above the water’s edge.55   
The Michigan Supreme Court via a 5-2 decision reversed, holding that the public 
trust doctrine provides Glass and other members of the public with the right to walk 
along the shore of the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark.56  The Court 
ruled that the State of Michigan has a sovereign obligation to protect and preserve 
the waters of the Great Lakes and the land beneath them for the public, and that the 
state serves as the trustee of public rights in the Great Lakes for fishing, hunting, and 
boating for commerce or pleasure.57  Further, the Court made clear that the 
geographic scope of the public’s rights was not necessarily co-extensive with the 
boundary between publicly and privately owned land.  Although the state has 
authority to convey title to lands underlying the Great Lakes to private parties (jus 
privatum), the private party takes such property subject to the public trust (jus 
publicum).58   
Noting that when applying the public trust doctrine to oceans courts traditionally 
have held that the public’s rights extend up to the ordinary high water mark,59 the 
Court acknowledged that the term “ordinary high water mark” has a less obvious 
meaning when applied to non-tidal waters like the Great Lakes.60  Nevertheless, 
because the levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate, the Court reasoned that the public 
trust should similarly extend to the shores of the Great Lakes that are sometimes 
submerged, and the Court borrowed Wisconsin’s definition of ordinary high water 
mark: the point on the shore up to which the presence of water is so continuous as to 
leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other 
easily recognized characteristics.61   
The Michigan Supreme Court went on to hold that walking along the shore 
between the ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge was a protected public 
trust activity.  The traditionally articulated rights protected by the public trust 
doctrine in Michigan are fishing, hunting, and navigation for commerce or pleasure.  
Reasoning that the public must be able to walk below the ordinary high water mark 
in order to engage in such protected activities, the Court held that the right to walk 
along the shore below the high water mark likewise is protected by the public trust.62  
The Court concluded with two caveats: the public trust doctrine does not protect 
every public use of private land below the ordinary high water mark, and exercise of 
protected public rights remains subject to regulation.63   
                                                                
55
 Id. at 63.  See also Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (court of 
appeals opinion). 
56
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62. 
57
 Id. at 64-65. 
58
 Id. at 64-66 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)). 
59
 Id. at 68. 
60
 Id. at 71. 
61
 Id. at 71-72 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)). 
62
 Id. at 74. 
63
 Id. at 75. 
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The dissenting justices did not dispute the existence of the public trust with 
respect to the Great Lakes and its underlying lands, but urged that the public trust 
geographically extended only to the water’s edge.64  Both dissenters agreed, though, 
that the public trust afforded the public the right to walk along the shore below the 
water’s edge, even if the shore were privately owned.65   
B.  Ohio 
In Ohio, by contrast, in Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources66 the 
Ohio court of appeals in August 2009 held that the public has no right to use the 
shore of Lake Erie above the water’s edge, because the public trust ends at the 
water’s edge.   
The Merrill case was initiated by lakefront property owners along Lake Erie, 
challenging an Ohio Department of Natural Resources policy requiring the littoral 
owners to obtain leases if they wanted to build structures (e.g., docks, wharves, 
piers) below the ordinary high water mark, even where the littoral owners’ deeds 
indicated their title extended to the water’s edge or lower.67  The state claimed it 
owns the beds of Lake Erie and the shore up to the ordinary high water mark, urging 
that Ohio had held such land in trust since it became a state in 1803.68  Plaintiffs 
sought a declaration that they own the shore below the ordinary high water mark, as 
described in their deeds, and furthermore that the public trust extends no further 
landward than the water’s edge.69  Environmental groups intervened as defendants, 
urging that their members have rights to make recreational use of the shore up to the 
ordinary high water mark pursuant to the public trust doctrine.70   
Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the Lake County Court of 
Common Pleas addressed the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine and the 
rights of the public, as well as the rights and duties of the state and littoral owners, 
                                                                
64
 Id. at 79-81 (Young, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 81-107 
(Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
65
 Id. at 85 & n.10 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Indeed, the 
dissenters seemingly would permit the public to walk on “wet sands” even slightly above the 
actual water’s edge, because they are infused with water and constitute submerged lands.  Id. 
at 101.  Justice Young joined in most of Justice Markman’s opinion.  Id. at 81 (Young, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
66
 State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008, 
2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009), notices of appeal filed, No. 2009-1806 
(Ohio Oct. 7, 2009).  The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the 2007 decision in the case by 
the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., 
No. 04CV001080, 2007 WL 4910860 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 11, 2007) (order granting 
plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment in part and denying defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment). 
67
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 2, 4, 28-30. 
68
 Id. ¶ 6.  The State of Ohio argued that the OHWM for Lake Erie had been 
administratively established as 573.4 feet (IGLD 1985) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  
Id. ¶ 2. 
69
 Id. ¶¶ 2-5, 9-14, 24, 28-30. 
70
 Id. ¶¶ 16, 46-49. 
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with respect to the shores of Lake Erie.71  The trial court held that the boundary line 
for purposes of title and the public trust is the water’s edge, “wherever that moveable 
boundary may be at any given time.”72  According to the trial court, the state owns 
below the water’s edge and the littoral owners own above the water’s edge; hence 
the court reformed the deeds and instructed that the state cannot require leases above 
the water’s edge.73  The trial court ruled that the public can boat, fish, and recreate 
below the water’s edge pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but the public has no 
rights above the water’s edge, and the littoral owners can lawfully exclude the public 
from the exposed shore above the water’s edge.74   
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District, except for the deed 
reformation, affirmed the common pleas court decision.75  Acknowledging that the 
case was one of first impression in Ohio,76 the court of appeals held that the water’s 
edge serves as the line of demarcation between the lands owned in trust by the state 
underlying Lake Erie and the privately owned lands of the littoral owners.77  Looking 
to language from earlier Ohio Supreme Court cases,78 as well as to the term “natural 
shoreline” in a statute it described as codifying the public trust doctrine,79 the court 
of appeals concluded that the water’s edge is the landward boundary for the public 
trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie in Ohio.80  The court found the water’s 
                                                                
71
 Id. ¶¶ 18-31; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-255. 
72
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 30; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶ 243. 
73
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 28-30; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-251. 
74
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 49; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-252. 
75
 The court of appeals vacated the common pleas court order only insofar as it reformed 
deeds, ruling that reformation of deeds was not before the trial court and the parties were not 
afforded the opportunity to argue their positions regarding the issue.  Merrill, 2009 WL 
2591758, ¶ 103.  Otherwise, the court of appeals affirmed the common pleas court order.  Id. ¶ 
131.  The court of appeals praised the “immensely scholarly opinion of the trial court,” 
attaching it as an appendix to its own opinion.  Id ¶ 59.   
76
 Id. ¶ 1. 
77
 Id. ¶¶ 127-29.  Interestingly, the majority in Merrill held that the State of Ohio lacked 
standing to pursue the appeal.  Id. ¶¶ 41-44.  In July 2007, the Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources, as directed by the governor, abandoned its policy that gave rise to the lawsuit—i.e., 
requiring Lake Erie littoral owners to lease land below the ordinary high water mark even if 
the land was within the terms of their deeds.  Since “[t]he governor has ordered ODNR to 
cease those activities that made it a party to the action,” the majority ruled that the Ohio 
Attorney General, who represented the State of Ohio in the case, lacked authority to proceed 
with the appeal.  Id. ¶ 44.  Because intervenors National Wildlife Federation and Ohio 
Environmental Council essentially had adopted the state’s arguments, see id. ¶ 23, the court of 
appeals decided the appeal on the merits.  One of the three judges concurred with the majority 
on the merits but dissented on the standing issue.  Id. ¶ 134-36 (Cannon, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  Both the State of Ohio and the environmental groups have sought review 
by the Ohio Supreme Court.  State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., No. 2009-
1806 (Ohio, notices of appeal filed Oct. 7, 2009).  
78
 Id. ¶¶ 60-71, 123-27.  
79
 Id. ¶ 67 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11 (West 2009)). 
80
 Id. ¶¶ 127-29. 
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edge to be synonymous with “shoreline,” which it defined as the line of actual 
physical contact by the water with the shore, undisturbed and under normal 
conditions.81  According to the court, the state owns the lakebed in trust below the 
water’s edge and the littoral owners own above the water’s edge.82  Reasoning that 
the littoral owner has the right to exclude the public from her property, the court held 
that the public has no right to use the privately owned shore of Lake Erie above the 
water’s edge.83   
The court of appeals acknowledged that the public trust doctrine affords the 
public a right to walk along the shore of Lake Erie, but only lakeward of the water’s 
edge.84  That is, a member of the public is entitled to walk in the waters of Lake Erie, 
but he has no right to walk landward of the water’s edge on privately-owned, 
exposed shore.85   
C.  The Problem 
The Michigan and Ohio cases demonstrate that, when ascertaining the scope and 
effect of the public trust doctrine with respect to the public’s right to walk the shores 
of the Great Lakes, there is little consensus regarding approach or result.  In the 
Michigan case, the trial court, the court of appeals, the supreme court majority, and 
the dissenting justices expressed at least four different viewpoints regarding the 
application of the public trust to the Great Lakes shores in the context of deciding 
whether the public had a right to walk along the shore above the water’s edge, with 
varying results.86  The Ohio case reflected yet another approach to the application of 
the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes shores, with still another result.87   
The confusion and controversy over the application of the public trust doctrine to 
the shores of the Great Lakes, including the public’s right to walk on privately 
owned land above the water’s edge, certainly is not limited to Michigan and Ohio.  
In Wisconsin, in the aftermath of Michigan’s Glass v. Goeckel decision, apparently 
many were surprised to learn that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
takes the position that, notwithstanding state ownership of the shores of the Great 
Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark, the public has no right to walk along the 
shores above the water’s edge because the littoral owner has exclusive right to use 
the shore between the ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge.88  The 
                                                                
81
 Id. ¶¶ 97, 127.  The appeals court defined “shore” as the area between the high and low 
water marks.  Id. ¶ 97. 
82
 Id. ¶¶ 127-29. 
83
 Id. ¶ 89. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. 
86
 See Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 703 N.W.2d 58 
(Mich. 2005). 
87
 State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008, 
2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009). 
88
 See WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., THE ORDINARY HIGH WATER MARK, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/water/wm/dsfm/shore/ohwm.htm (last visited May. 27, 2010); see also 
Pratt, supra note 35, at 246-47.  The rule enforced by the Wisconsin DNR is “keep your feet 
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agency’s position is based on a 1923 Wisconsin Supreme Court case.89  An editorial 
in one of Wisconsin’s leading newspapers described the situation as “ridiculous” and 
called for a change in the law to allow the public to walk along the shores of the 
Great Lakes without the necessity of keeping their feet wet.90   
A decade ago in Pennsylvania, the Department of Environmental Protection 
published a Public Access Policy that stated the public had a right of foot access 
along privately owned shore of Lake Erie in the “public easement area” between the 
ordinary high and low water marks.91  However, the department continued to receive 
many questions regarding the public’s right to walk the shore of Lake Erie, and it is 
not clear whether the policy is still in effect. 92   
It is vital that the public trust doctrine be applied correctly to the Great Lakes 
shores.  The public trust doctrine tries to strike a balance between the rights of the 
public to use important natural resources and the rights of littoral landowners to use 
their property.93  Where the law tips too far in favor of the littoral landowners, 
important public resources effectively are monopolized by a few.  Where the law tilts 
too far in favor of the public, valuable private property rights get trampled by the 
many.  If the law is uncertain, the public may trespass on or interfere with private 
property rights by overestimating the public’s rights to use the shore (e.g., walking 
too far from the water’s edge, engaging in intrusive non-protected uses).  
Alternatively, the public may not fully exercise their rights to use the shore, and the 
state may fail to protect the shore from littoral owners who overestimate their own 
rights and interfere with the trust resources (e.g., erecting a structure).94  Further, the 
federal government has predicted that global warming may cause nearly a two-foot 
drop in the average level of the Great Lakes by the end of this century.95  As lake 
levels drop, there is significantly more exposed shore inviting public use.  Plus, there 
is more impetus for littoral owners to construct new development (e.g., wharves) to 
                                                          
wet”—i.e., you can walk the shore, but only below the water’s edge.  The public trust doctrine 
regarding the Great Lakes in Wisconsin is discussed in Part V.H infra. 
89
 Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923) (involving Lake Winnebago).   
90
 Ricardo Pimentel, Editorial, Lake Michigan Beaches: What Is a ‘Public Use’?, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 2006, at A16. 
91
 See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS 2000-2001, available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/ 
advcoun/czac/CZAC00hilites.html (last visited May. 27 2010). 
92
 PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
HIGHLIGHTS 2001-2002, at 5-6 (Jul. 17, 2002), available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/ 
subject/advcoun/czac/2002/ czac0102hilites.pdf  (last visited May. 27, 2010). 
93
 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 13, at 309; Thompson, supra note 7, at 59-60. 
94
 See Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty: 
Defining Evolving Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 233 (2008) (describing similar problems for the state, public, and private owners 
due to uncertainty regarding the public trust doctrine). 
95
 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 119 (Karl et al. eds., 2009) (higher temperatures mean greater evaporation).  
Due to the slope of the shore in many places along the Great Lakes, a one-foot drop in water 
level can mean a significant increase in newly exposed shore.  Id. 
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access the more distant water, and there is more room on the shore for them to 
develop, all of which could interfere with public use of the shore.  Accordingly, a 
principled legal approach that leads to the proper and predictable application of the 
public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shores is critical.   
IV.  THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Public trust law is not uniform throughout the Great Lakes region because, at 
least in part, the scope of the doctrine in each state is a function of that individual 
state’s laws.  Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “the individual [s]tates have the authority to define the limits of the lands 
held in public trust.”96  Nevertheless, as also discussed below, states are not 
unfettered in establishing the scope of the public trust doctrine.  This part of the 
Article argues that the scope of the public trust doctrine with respect to the Great 
Lakes shores in each state should be determined by using a uniform analytical 
framework, based on the core principles of the public trust doctrine.  The dispute 
regarding the public’s right to walk along the shores of the Great Lakes serves as the 
focal point for discussion of my proposed framework.   
The public trust doctrine, as mentioned above, traditionally has applied to 
navigable waters and their underlying lands, to protect their use by the public for 
navigation, fishing, and commerce.97  But, as reflected by Glass v. Goeckel in 
Michigan and Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources in Ohio, whether the 
public trust doctrine provides the public a right to walk along the shore of the Great 
Lakes above the water’s edge is hotly disputed.  Using my proposed framework, 
resolution of the dispute in each state requires an examination of two questions: (1) 
Does the public trust geographically extend to Great Lakes shores above the water’s 
edge? (2) Is walking the shore a public use protected by the public trust doctrine?   
A.  Geographic Scope 
Preliminarily, it is important to emphasize that the scope of the public trust 
doctrine does not depend on whether the land is currently owned by the state.  In 
general, the beds of the Great Lakes are owned by the states, not private parties.98  
The landward boundary between state-owned beds and privately owned uplands 
differs from state to state.  As discussed in Part V below, some states recognize 
ownership in the state up to the high water mark on the shore,99 while other states 
own only up to the low water mark.100  The boundary for public trust purposes, 
though, need not be the same as the boundary for title purposes.   
                                                                
96
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); see also Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894). 
97
 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37, 452 (1892); SAX ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 590.  
98
 See infra Part V. 
99
 For example, Indiana and Wisconsin recognize ownership up to the high water mark.  
See infra Parts V.D. & V.H. 
100
 For example, Pennsylvania and Minnesota recognize ownership only up to the low 
water mark.  See infra Parts V.G & V.E. 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
18 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1 
English common law centuries ago established that the public trust doctrine can 
apply to lands no longer owned by the crown.  Differentiating between the jus 
privatum and the jus publicum, English common law made clear that although the 
crown could transfer title to lands underlying navigable waters to a private party, the 
crown continues to hold the land in trust for the people to use.101  The U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Nineteenth Century likewise recognized that while the states could 
transfer title to lands underlying navigable waters to a private party, the lands 
remained subject to the public trust for the people to use for purposes including 
navigation and fishing.102   
1.  The Starting Point  
But what defines the landward boundary of the lands underlying navigable waters 
subject to the public trust doctrine, if not state ownership?  In my framework, the 
starting point for the analysis is the lands that passed to the Great Lakes states in 
trust when they first became states.  As previously mentioned, lands subject to the 
public trust doctrine underlying navigable waters have both jus privatum and jus 
publicum interests.  While the jus privatum can be transferred by the government to a 
private party, the jus publicum remains with the government to hold in trust for the 
people.  That the land was burdened with the jus publicum before the private party 
acquired the jus privatum is what makes the public trust doctrine such an effective 
shield against a takings claim.  If the private title holder claims her property has been 
taken because she is forced to allow the public to use the property (or because the 
state restricts her use of the property in order to preserve a protected public use), the 
state can urge that there has been no taking because her property always has been 
subject to the public’s right to use the land and thus there has been no change in her 
private property rights in the land.103  Hence, to avoid any argument that by 
recognizing the public trust doctrine the state is taking private property without 
compensation, the starting point for ascertaining the current scope of the public trust 
doctrine in a state should begin with those lands that the state originally held in 
trust.104   
                                                                
101
 Hale, supra note 11; see Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-13. 
102
 Shively, 152 U.S. at 56; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-54. 
103
 See, e.g., Kleinsasser, supra note 33, at 437-38; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 649; Klass, 
supra note 6, at 739-42.  It is more problematic and controversial to impose anew a jus 
publicum interest on privately owned land that was never before subject to this public interest.  
See James Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden Victory for Private 
Property?, 19 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10051, 10055-56 (1989) (arguing that recognition of public trust 
in properties beyond what states originally owned constitutes a taking) [hereinafter, Huffman, 
Hidden Victory].  However, the public trust doctrine is dynamic, see Marks v. Whitney, 491 
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs”), and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that background principles can evolve for purposes of 
takings analysis, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (“changed 
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so”). 
104
 Where the land is now owned by the state, however, the state could choose to apply the 
public trust doctrine to lands not originally subject to the public trust.  For example, in some 
states, state-owned parks can be subject to the public trust.  See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. 
Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York., 750 
N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001). 
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a.  The Equal Footing Doctrine 
Identifying those lands that originally passed to a state in trust implicates the 
equal footing doctrine.  Both the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine 
are grounded in the importance of navigable waters and the lands underlying them, 
and several of the same Supreme Court cases have shaped and linked both 
doctrines.105  The equal footing doctrine provides that each new state that enters the 
Union receives title to the lands underlying navigable and tidal waters within its 
boundaries, absent a clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal 
government.106  The equal footing doctrine originated in Pollard v. Hagan,107 in 
which the Court held that Alabama had obtained title to the lands underlying tidal 
waters within its borders when it was admitted to the Union.  The Pollard Court 
based its decision, in part, upon the statehood clause of the U.S. Constitution108 and 
the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that new states would 
enter the Union “on an equal footing with the original States.”109  The Supreme Court 
earlier, in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,110 had held that the original thirteen states 
acquired from the crown upon the American Revolution lands underlying tidal 
waters, which the crown had held in trust for use by the people for navigation and 
fishing.  Due to the importance of navigable waters, the Pollard Court held that for 
Alabama to enter the Union on an equal sovereign footing with the original states, it 
must have received ownership of the lands underlying such tidal waters when it 
became a state; hence the Court ruled that the federal government had no power to 
transfer land underlying tidal water in Alabama post-statehood since the land already 
                                                                
105
 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively, 152 U.S. 1.  A 
number of commentators have noted a strong link between the equal footing doctrine and the 
public trust doctrine.  See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10053-56; 
Rasband, supra note 10; Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 426-27. 
106
 See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197 (1987).  
107
 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
108
 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union . . . .”). 
109
 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. V, 1 STAT. 50, 53 (1789).  The Northwest 
Ordinance further specified that “[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. 
Lawrence, . . . shall be common highways, and forever free.”  Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
ch. 8, art. IV, 1 STAT. 50, 52 (1789).  The Northwest Ordinance created the Northwest 
Territory from lands northwest of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River.  The 
original states relinquished their claims to the lands in the Northwest Territory to the federal 
government, and the Northwest Ordinance set forth the terms and process by which new states 
would be created from the Northwest Territory.  Originally enacted in 1787 pursuant to the 
Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance was re-adopted by Congress following 
ratification of the Constitution.  See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 STAT. 50-53 
(1789); Rasband, supra note 10, at 31-33. 
110
 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).  The Illinois Central Court 
relied heavily upon Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee and an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court 
case, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821), to support its finding that Illinois held the beds 
of Lake Michigan in trust.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,  456-57 (1892). 
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had passed to the state.111  It is now well settled that the equal footing doctrine 
applies to all new states entering the Union,112 and that new states received title to 
lands underlying waters actually navigable as well as those subject to the ebb and 
flow of tides.113   
The Court in Shively v. Bowlby,114 correcting dicta in Pollard, clarified that states 
received title to lands underlying navigable waters upon entering the Union, absent a 
clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal government.  The Shively 
Court was faced with the question of whether the United States had made a pre-
statehood grant of land below the high water mark of the Columbia River to plaintiff, 
or whether such land had passed to the defendant State of Oregon when it entered the 
Union.  Re-affirming the equal footing doctrine, the Court held that title to the lands 
underlying navigable waters passed to newly admitted states, absent a clear pre-
statehood grant or reservation by the federal government of such lands.115  The Court 
found no such clear pre-statehood grant in this case and ruled the State of Oregon 
owned the riverbed.116  Importantly, the Court ruled that, prior to Oregon becoming a 
state, the federal government held the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for 
the future state.  Contrary to Pollard dicta, the Court ruled that the federal 
government had the power to make pre-statehood grants of land below the high 
water mark of navigable waters, at least under certain exceptional circumstances.117  
The Court, though, found that in light of the public trust interest in such lands and 
navigable waters—for commerce, navigation, and fishing—the policy of the United 
States had been not to make such pre-statehood grants.118  Since then, only rarely 
have pre-statehood grants or reservations by the federal government been found to 
defeat title passing to the new states under the equal footing doctrine for lands 
underlying navigable waters.119   
                                                                
111
 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. 
112
 Although the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 applied by its terms only to those states 
formed from the Northwest Territory (i.e., Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin), 
its “equal footing” language became a model for the enabling acts of all new states.  See 
SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 19. 
113
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 
94 U.S. 324 (1876). 
114
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
115
 Id. at 26, 48, 57-58. 
116
 Id. at 58. 
117
 The Court stated:  
[C]ongress has the power to make grants of lands below high-water mark of navigable 
waters in any territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in 
order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands 
for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the 
several states, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for 
which the United States hold the territory.  
Id. at 48. 
118
 Id. at 48-49. 
119
 See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987) (general 
rule); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (rare exception). 
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Perhaps even more importantly, the Shively Court identified a further link 
between the public trust doctrine and the lands underlying navigable waters, which 
the states received pursuant to the equal footing doctrine.  Acknowledging that states 
could choose to cede title to lands underlying navigable waters to private parties, the 
Court also recognized that the states retained a trust obligation for those lands and 
the public still had rights to make use of those lands, even where the states no longer 
owned those lands.  The Shively Court traced the history of the public trust doctrine, 
and the concepts of jus publicum and jus privatum, from England to the United 
States, and the Court noted that in states where title was privately owned to the low 
water mark, the public continued to have rights to navigate and fish up to the high 
water mark.120  Although the holding in Shively was based on the equal footing 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has termed Shively the “seminal case in American 
public trust jurisprudence.”121   
 More recently, the Court re-affirmed the linkage between lands passing pursuant 
to the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine.  In Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Mississippi,122 the Court held that the State of Mississippi received title to 
tidelands pursuant to the equal footing doctrine since they were subject to the ebb 
and flow, even though the waters overlying the tidelands were not actually 
navigable.  The Court found that Mississippi had acquired title to the tidelands when 
it entered the Union, continued to hold the tidelands in trust thereafter, had not 
relinquished title to the tidelands, and hence was still the owner of the tidelands—
notwithstanding that private owners had held record title and paid taxes on the 
tidelands for decades.123  In so ruling, the Court acknowledged that although some 
states have chosen to recognize private title to such tidelands, those lands 
nevertheless had passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and the 
public still had rights to use those lands for protected uses under the public trust 
doctrine.124   
So, what does the equal footing doctrine instruct regarding the lands underlying 
navigable waters received in trust by the states when they joined the Union?  First, 
                                                                
120
 Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-25. 
121
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988). 
122
 Id. 
123
 Id. at 483-84 & n.12.  Mississippi wanted to lease the tidelands to another private party 
for mineral exploration.  Because mineral exploration is not a protected use under the public 
trust doctrine, the state needed to claim ownership of the tidelands, whereupon it could lease 
them for mineral development as a permissible public purpose consistent with the public trust 
doctrine.  The Court held that whether events subsequent to statehood had transferred title to 
the record owners was a matter of state law, and the Court upheld the Mississippi Supreme 
Court’s determination that no such transfer had occurred under Mississippi law.  Id. at 483-85.  
124
 Id. at 483-84 & n.12.  Commentators, even those hostile to the public trust doctrine, 
have recognized the link between the lands that passed to the states pursuant to the equal 
footing doctrine and the lands the states hold in trust for use by the people.  Huffman, Hidden 
Victory, supra note 103, at 10053-56 (equating geographic scope of public trust doctrine to 
lands states acquired pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and arguing states cannot extend 
public trust doctrine to lands not previously in state ownership).  See also Sylvia Quast & 
Michael Mantell, Role of the States, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 67, 69 (Donald 
C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008); Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 426-27. 
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navigable waters for purposes of the equal footing doctrine mean waters that were 
navigable in fact, or were subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, at the time of the 
state’s admission.125  Waters are navigable in fact when they are used, or are 
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, 
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade 
and travel.126  The Great Lakes unquestionably are navigable waters for purposes of 
the equal footing doctrine.   
Second, my research indicates that the boundary for lands underlying navigable 
waters for purposes of the equal footing doctrine is, as a matter of federal law, the 
“ordinary high water mark” (OHWM).  That is, the lands underlying navigable 
waters that passed from the federal government to each new state at the time of 
admission extended to the OHWM.   
Multiple Supreme Court cases teach that the boundary between the underlying 
lands passed to the state pursuant to the equal footing doctrine and the uplands 
retained by the federal government is the OHWM.127  For example, the Pollard Court 
held that Alabama received title to all lands under navigable waters up to the “usual 
high water-mark,”128 and the federal government had no power to grant such lands 
following Alabama’s admission to the Union.129  In Phillips, the Court ruled that 
pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, Mississippi acquired title upon statehood to all 
tidelands inland to the mean high water mark,130 which the state then held in trust 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine.  In Shively, Oregon acquired title to lands under 
tidal waters up to the high water mark under the equal footing doctrine, and title to 
these lands passed in trust to the states.131  In so ruling, the Court noted that English 
common law recognized title in the crown up to the high water mark and that lands 
below the high water mark are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the same 
manner as uplands.132  While many of its decisions involved the shores of tidal 
waters, the Court also has held that the boundary for lands passing pursuant to the 
equal footing doctrine underlying navigable freshwaters is the OHWM.133  For 
                                                                
125
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476 (waters subject to ebb and flow of tides passed to 
states pursuant to equal footing doctrine, irrespective that not navigable in fact); Utah v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (whether lake was navigable in fact under federal law 
determines whether lakebed passed to state upon admission pursuant to equal footing 
doctrine). 
126
 Utah, 403 U.S. at 10; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).  If a water body is 
navigable, that the water is too shallow near shore to float a boat does not render that portion 
of the water body non-navigable.  See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 480.  
127
 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. 469; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); 
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
128
 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220. 
129
 Id. at 230.  Indeed, the Pollard Court described the lands passing to the states as “[t]he 
shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them.”  Id. 
130
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473. 
131
 Shively, 152 U.S. at 26, 51, 57-58. 
132
 Id. at 57-58. 
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example, in Barney v. City of Keokuk,134 the Court held that Iowa took title below the 
OHWM along the Mississippi River when it was admitted to the Union, relying upon 
the common law and the Court’s decisions in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee and 
Pollard.135  The Court went on to explain that, even if a state permitted the shore 
below OHWM to be privately owned, it would still be subject to public use.136   
The equal footing doctrine and public trust doctrine cases in the Supreme Court, 
although they frequently use the term “high water mark” or “ordinary high water 
mark” in describing the boundary, do not provide much detail regarding how to 
determine the location of such mark on the shore.137  However, other authorities fill 
in the details.  In England at common law, the boundary between uplands privately 
owned and tidelands owned by the crown was the medium high tide line.138  That is, 
the shore “over which the daily tides ebb and flow,” “the land between ordinary high 
and low water mark[s],” was owned by the crown.139  When determining the 
boundary of a federal grant of uplands along tidal waters, the federal government 
uses the mean high tide line, determined as the average of all high tides over a period 
of 18.6 years.140   
For navigable waters not impacted by tides, early American common law 
generally defined OHWM as the point on the shore where the presence and action of 
the water are so common and usual as to leave a distinct mark.141  As with oceans, 
                                                          
133
 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997) (beds of navigable 
lake below high water mark passed in trust to state pursuant to equal footing doctrine); 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (beds of navigable river below high water 
mark were not reserved by Congress via treaty from passing to state upon admission). 
134
 Barney v. City of Keokuk , 94 U.S. 324 (1876). 
135
 Id. at 337-38.  The Court acknowledged that some states had followed the English 
common law rule and recognized private ownership of beds of actually navigable, non-tidal 
rivers.  But the Court emphasized that while such states could “choose to resign to the riparian 
proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity,” the beds and 
shores of navigable rivers “properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty.”  Id. at 
338.  The Court also noted that the federal government observed the high water mark when 
making surveys and grants.  Id. 
136
 Id. at 339.  See Huffman, Takings Clause, supra note 33, at 185-86 (“When states 
joined the Union, they acquired title to the submerged lands between the high water marks on 
navigable waters pursuant to the equal footing doctrine.  Subject to the limits of the public 
trust doctrine, the states were then free to dispose of the submerged lands or to recognize a 
different border between the publicly owned submerged lands and private riparian lands. . . . 
Whether the private riparian’s title extends to the high or low water mark, the rights associated 
with that title, including the right to exclude others, have always been subject to the same 
public rights that limit the rights of water users.”). 
137
 See FLUSHMAN, supra note 45, at 301 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has not 
given the term ‘ordinary high-water mark’ any precise meaning.”). 
138
 See Attorney General v. Chambers, 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (1854); see also Borax Consol. 
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). 
139
 Borax, 296 U.S. at 22-23. 
140
 See id. at 27. 
141
 See Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381, 427 (1852) (Curtis, J., concurring); 2 HENRY 
FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 417, at 1461 (1904); FLUSHMAN, supra 
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OHWM along shores of non-tidal waters refers to the highest level of the water 
under normal conditions, not the highest level reached during extraordinary 
conditions such as floods.142  OHWM is a visible mark, such as the line where 
terrestrial vegetation ends or the soil changes character.143   
While certain states recognized private title below the OHWM,144 it does not 
change the fact that the lands underlying those navigable waters up to the OHWM 
passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing doctrine.  As the Court explained in 
Shively, the “title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high-
water mark of navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the several 
states.”145  However, the initial determination of the boundary, which passed to the 
state pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, is a matter of federal law.146  Hence, 
federal law, not state law, governs what the states acquired pursuant to the equal 
footing doctrine.147  Indeed, it would be somewhat of a misnomer if the equal footing 
doctrine provided that some states received lands up to the OHWM upon admission 
to the Union while other states did not.   
The conclusion that the OHWM serves as the boundary under federal law for 
lands underlying navigable waters which passed to states pursuant to the equal 
footing doctrine is buttressed by the fact that the OHWM also serves as the boundary 
along navigable waters under federal law in other contexts.  The boundary between 
uplands and state-owned tidelands or river beds for purposes of a federal grant is the 
OHWM as a matter of federal law.148  The federal Submerged Lands Act confirmed 
that the federal government has no claim to lands underlying non-tidal navigable 
waters below the OHWM.149   
                                                          
note 45, at § 7.10; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES § 3.09(3)(d) 
(1988). 
142
 Legal Institute of the Great Lakes, Public Trust Doctrine in Ohio 28 (1999). 
143
 See Howard, 54 U.S. at 427; 2 FARNHAM, supra note 141, at 1461 (1904); TARLOCK, 
supra note 141, at § 3.09(3)(d); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(a)(2), at 175-77 (Robert 
E. Beck ed., 1991).  Where the nature of the shore is such that a line may not be visible (e.g., a 
rocky bluff), other information can be used to help determine OHWM.  See State v. Trudeau, 
408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987) (compare to other places on the shore of the same lake); 
FLUSHMAN, supra note 45, at § 8.7.2 (lake level statistical data). 
144
 A few coastal states recognize title in the state for tidelands only up to the low water 
mark, and several states follow the so-called English rule by which the beds of navigable 
rivers are owned by riparians rather than the state.  See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-26, 
31 (1894); SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 70-72. 
145
 Shively, 152 U.S. at 40. 
146
 Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376 
(1977) (boundary of lands underlying navigable river which passed to state pursuant to equal 
footing doctrine is determined by federal law, but federal law does not govern title issues for 
such lands following a state’s admission).   
147
 Id.; see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971). 
148
 See Oregon, 429 U.S. 363 (riverbed); Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 
U.S. 10 (tidelands). 
149
 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1311(a) (2006).  The Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 
response to United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), and relinquishes federal claims to 
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Further, the boundary recognized for the federal navigational servitude is the 
OHWM.  The federal navigational servitude, premised on Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power to regulate navigable waters,150 permits the federal government to 
displace or destroy property rights, which would ordinarily be compensable as 
takings of private property without just compensation, in order to promote 
navigability.151  As a matter of federal law, the navigational servitude extends to the 
OHWM along navigable waters.  Although there may not be one uniform definition 
of OHWM for purposes of the navigational servitude, it essentially means the point 
on the shore where the water stands sufficiently long to destroy vegetation below it 
or otherwise create a visible line.152   
Moreover, that some states did not recognize title in the states up to the OHWM 
certainly does not mean that the trust obligations passed to the states upon their 
admission did not extend to the OHWM.  As discussed above, the federal 
government held the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for future states.  
Consistent with the concepts of jus privatum and jus publicum, a state could choose 
to relinquish title below the OHWM to a private party.  But the state could not 
simply relinquish the trust obligation inherited from the federal government, and the 
state continued to hold the shores up to the OHWM in trust, notwithstanding title to 
those shores were held by the riparian or littoral landowner.153   
Lastly, as previously noted, the equal footing doctrine provides that land 
underlying navigable waters did not pass to the state where the federal government 
made a clear, pre-statehood grant or reservation of such underlying land.  Such pre-
statehood grants or reservations must be abundantly clear, and only rarely has the 
federal government actually made such a pre-statehood grant or reservation of lands 
below the OHWM of navigable waters.154  Theoretically, though, if the federal 
                                                          
title to lands beneath navigable waters, including the Great Lakes to the international border.  
43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312; see also Quast & Mantell, supra note 124, at 69.  
150
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
151
 See SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 540.  Navigable waters for purposes of the navigational 
servitude are defined similarly, but not identically, to navigable waters under the equal footing 
doctrine.  The former, sometimes referred to as navigable-in-fact, depends on whether the 
waterway previously, presently, or in the future was/is/will be capable of sustaining commerce 
with reasonable improvements.  The latter, sometimes referred to as navigable-for-title, 
depends on whether the waterway in its natural condition was capable of being used for 
commerce at the time of statehood by then customary modes of transport.  See JAMES 
RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 832 
(2004).  The immunity from takings claims afforded the federal government by the 
navigational servitude is similar to the takings immunity provided to states by the public trust 
doctrine.  Id. at 833.  
152
 See Gollatee v. Harrell, 731 F. Supp. 453, 461 (S.D. Ala. 1989). 
153
 See Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10055 n.46 (“The public trust 
doctrine would justify public rights in privately owned submerged lands where those lands 
were previously held by the state and were alienated subject to the public trust.  Thus the 
public trust applies to private lands between the low and high water marks on navigable waters 
because those lands were part of what the state acquired at the time of statehood.”). 
154
 See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987); Montana 
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981).  “[D]isposals by the United States during the 
territorial period are not lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless 
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government made a grant of land below the OHWM along the Great Lakes to a 
private party before that state was admitted to the Union, the land subject to the 
federal grant would be privately owned and title would not pass into the state’s hands 
pursuant to the equal footing doctrine.  Even in those circumstances, however, the 
land below OHWM that the private party received via a pre-statehood federal grant 
still should have been within the scope of the public trust doctrine at the time the 
state was admitted to the Union.  Recall that pre-statehood, the federal government 
held those lands underlying navigable waters in trust, just as the crown previously 
had held such lands in trust.  When the federal government made its pre-statehood 
grant to a private party, only the jus privatum should have been transferred; the jus 
publicum should have remained with the federal government, consistent with its trust 
obligation.  Therefore, when the state entered the Union, the jus publicum in such 
land underlying navigable waters would have passed to the state, which then 
continued to hold the land in trust pursuant to the public trust doctrine, irrespective 
that the state never received title to such land.155   
b.  The Original States 
Two Great Lakes states, New York and Pennsylvania, were among the original 
thirteen states, and hence they were not subject to the equal footing doctrine 
applicable to newly admitted states.156  Although lands underlying navigable waters 
did not pass from the federal government to the original states, it nevertheless is my 
conclusion that the original states received lands underlying navigable waters, 
including the Great Lakes, in trust when they became states.   
As discussed above, in England at common law, the crown owned the lands 
underlying navigable waters in trust for the people up to the ordinary high water 
mark.157  In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,158 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
crown’s interests in the tidelands off New Jersey passed to the state upon the 
American Revolution, thus making the state the owner in trust of the tidelands below 
the ordinary high water mark.  Although a few of the original states recognized title 
for oceanfront landowners down to the low water mark of tidal waters, the Supreme 
Court nevertheless observed that the privately owned shore between low and high 
water mark was subject to the public’s use for navigation and fishing.159  That is, 
although jus privatum in tidelands may have been transferred to private parties below 
OHWM, the jus publicum remained with the state in trust up to OHWM.160   
                                                          
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain.”  United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926). 
155
 See Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81 (1884) (finding that even if there had been an 
express pre-1803 grant of a parcel under Lake Erie to a private party by Connecticut that was 
authorized by the federal government, the grant was subject to the public’s rights to navigate 
and fish).  But see Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198 
(1984) (federal patent pursuant to treaty obligation extinguished public trust easement). 
156
 SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 18. 
157
 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
158
 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 
159
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483-84 & n.12; Shively, 152 U.S. at 18-26. 
160
 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 18-26, 57; SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 70. 
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The analysis becomes somewhat more complicated in the original states, 
however, when focusing on non-tidal waters.  In England, with few exceptions, only 
tidal waters were actually navigable, and therefore tidal waters and navigable waters 
were synonymous terms under English common law; accordingly, rivers above the 
ebb and flow of the tides were not viewed as navigable waters and their beds were 
privately owned.161  In America, some jurisdictions followed the so-called English 
rule of title and did not recognize state ownership of the beds of non-tidal waters, 
even though such rivers were actually navigable.162  Although Pennsylvania rejected 
the so-called English rule and recognized title in the state for lands underlying 
actually navigable rivers,163 New York followed the English rule in part: most 
actually navigable rivers in New York were deemed non-navigable for purposes of 
title, and their beds became privately owned.164  Hence, in contrast to the new states 
subject to the equal footing doctrine, it is not as easy to say that the original states 
received title to lands underlying all non-tidal, navigable-in-fact waters at the time of 
the Revolution.  Nevertheless, in both New York and Pennsylvania, the state 
apparently has always owned the lands under the Great Lakes.165   
Regardless of title, however, it is fair to conclude that the starting point for 
purposes of the geographic boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great 
Lakes shores in New York and Pennsylvania should be the OHWM, just as it is for 
the other Great Lakes states.  First, the Supreme Court in Illinois Central made clear 
that the limitation of navigability to tidal waters, as in England, was inapplicable to 
the United States for purposes of the public trust doctrine, and hence ruled that the 
Great Lakes and their underlying lands were subject to the public trust doctrine.166  
Second, the Supreme Court has instructed, albeit in dicta, that just as the lands along 
tidal waters are owned in trust by the states up to the high water mark, the same rule 
applies to the Great Lakes, “which are treated as inland seas.”167  Third, since the 
equal footing doctrine provides that the new states received lands underlying all 
navigable waters up to the OHWM in order to be on equal sovereign footing with the 
original states,168 it would be odd to conclude that the original states themselves did 
not have the same sovereign rights and duties, including the public trust doctrine, up 
to the OHWM along the Great Lakes.  Fourth, as discussed in Part V below, 
                                                                
161
 See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851). 
162
 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 31. 
163
 Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).  In Pennsylvania, the state owns up to the low 
water mark, but the riparian’s title between the low and high water marks is subordinate to the 
public trust.  See, e.g., Fulmer v. Williams, 15 A. 726 (Pa. 1888); see also infra Part V.G. 
164
 See Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); 
Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1997). 
165
 People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 20 N.E. 577 (N.Y. 1889); see also Sprague v. Nelson, 
6 Pa. D. & C. 493 (Erie C.P. 1924). 
166
 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1892). 
167
 Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891).  The Court did not apply the same rules to 
rivers.  Id. 
168
 See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
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recognizing the public trust doctrine up to the OHWM along the Great Lakes shores 
is consistent with both New York and Pennsylvania law.169   
In sum, the Great Lakes states, upon admission to the Union, received at least a 
jus publicum interest in the land underlying the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high 
water mark in trust for the people of their states.  As discussed below, however, that 
is just the starting point and does not necessarily mean that the same boundary for 
the public trust doctrine persists today along the Great Lakes shores.   
2.  Changes in the Boundary 
a.  By the State 
Language in two important Supreme Court decisions, one from the Nineteenth 
Century and one of recent vintage, arguably instructs that each state may re-define 
the scope of the public trust doctrine in that state.  The Shively Court, explaining why 
new states admitted to the Union did not necessarily claim title to all lands 
underlying navigable waters up to the OHWM, said that “[t]he title and rights of 
riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark . . . are governed by 
the laws of the several States, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the 
Constitution.”170  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,171 the Court held that 
states acquired at the time of statehood and held in public trust all land underlying 
waters influenced by the tide, as well as actually navigable waters.  Noting that the 
original states did not uniformly claim title to all non-navigable tidal waters, the 
Court in Phillips said that “it has been long established that the individual States 
have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to 
recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”172 
Some have read these passages as empowering states to expand the scope of the 
public trust doctrine beyond lands underlying navigable waters.173  Others have 
responded that such expansion of the public trust doctrine would effect an 
uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Constitution.174  Less 
attention has been paid to the prospect that the language in Shively and Phillips could 
authorize a state to shrink the lands subject to the public trust doctrine.  Tellingly, 
both Merrill and the dissent in Glass v. Goeckel, en route to opining that the 
boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shores is the water’s 
edge rather than the OHWM, cited Shively as teaching that “state law determined the 
scope of the public trust in land beneath navigable waters” and “the scope of lands 
subject to the public trust is determined by state law,” respectively.175 
                                                                
169
 See infra Parts V.F and V.G. 
170
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894). 
171
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
172
 Id. at 475 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26) (emphasis added). 
173
 See, e.g., Laura H. Kosloff, Comment, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Is the 
Public Trust Becoming Synonymous With the Public Interest?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10200 
(1988). 
174
 See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10054-56. 
175
 Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. State of Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Nos. 2008-L-007, 
2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009), ¶ 77; Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 
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The language of Shively and Phillips should not be read as a free ticket for a state 
to draw a line anywhere it chooses as defining the limits of the public trust.  For 
example, what if the Illinois legislature were to define the public trust as excluding 
the submerged beds of Lake Michigan in the Chicago harbor?  This would allow the 
legislature to evade the public trust doctrine, and the holding in Illinois Central 
voiding the grant of such submerged lands to the railroad, simply by declaring 
beforehand that those submerged lands were no longer subject to the public trust.  By 
re-defining the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine, the state effectively 
would emasculate the public trust doctrine that otherwise could be—and was—used 
to invalidate transfer of those same submerged lands to the railroad.   
One way of reconciling the Court’s statements in Shively and Phillips with 
Illinois Central is to view Shively and Phillips as speaking solely to the issues of title 
and riparian or littoral rights.  Both cases essentially were quiet title actions, deciding 
whether title to tidelands should be in the state or in private parties.176  While both 
cases discuss the public trust doctrine, the equal footing doctrine was dispositive in 
both cases.177  Neither case involved a state trying to terminate the public’s rights to 
use lands underlying navigable waters.  Further, the quoted language from Shively 
does not actually say that the state’s ability to terminate the jus publicum for lands it 
holds in trust is the subject of state law; rather, it is the “title and rights of riparian or 
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters” that are 
governed by state laws.178  Thus, that a state may recognize title to the shore in a 
private party, or recognize that the upland owner may have littoral rights such as 
water access or wharfing out, would not be inconsistent with the state retaining a jus 
publicum interest in the shore for use by the public.   
The language in Phillips is somewhat harder to reconcile in the same manner, as 
the Court expressly said that states “have the authority to define the limits of the 
lands held in public trust.”179  However, the Court cited Shively for this 
proposition,180 and as discussed above, Shively neither holds nor teaches that states 
could shrink the lands subject to the public trust.  Further, the language in Phillips is 
in the midst of an explanation that not all states claim title to all lands under 
tidelands and navigable waters, en route to the Court’s holding that Mississippi 
                                                          
87 n.12 (Markman, J., dissenting).  The Glass v. Goeckel majority also cited Shively and 
Phillips Petroleum, to support its conclusion that recognition of the public’s right to walk 
along the shore above the water’s edge, on private property, was a matter of state law and did 
not constitute a taking.  Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 78 n.35. 
176
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472; Shively, 152 U.S. at 9; see also Wilkinson, supra 
note 25, at 462.  
177
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 484 (tidelands at issue became property of Mississippi 
upon its admission to the Union, even though not actually navigable); Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-
58 (tidelands at issue became property of Oregon upon its admission to the Union, and were 
not subject to a pre-statehood grant by the federal government). 
178
 Shively, 152 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added). 
179
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475. 
180
 Id. 
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acquired title to lands underlying non-navigable tidal waters pursuant to the equal 
footing doctrine.181   
But a corollary to such a reconciliation would be that the states only have power 
to transfer jus privatum and that the public’s right to use the shore could never be 
abrogated; once a state acquires land underlying navigable waters in trust, it must 
always maintain that land for the uses protected by the public trust doctrine.  That is, 
forever into the future, every inch of the shore must be kept open to the public for 
protected uses such as navigation, fishing, and commerce.  Future changes in uses of 
the shores that may be beneficial to the public—say, using a portion of the shore to 
construct a public aquarium—would be foreclosed, because the change would render 
a portion of the shore no longer available for navigation, fishing, and commerce by 
the public.  Use of the shores would become ossified, ultimately to the public’s 
detriment.182   
A closer look at Illinois Central, however, reveals another way of reconciling its 
teachings with the language of Shively and Phillips.  In short, states have some 
ability to re-define the limits of the lands subject to the public trust, but their ability 
to do so is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine itself.   
The Court in Illinois Central did not flatly prohibit sale of lands underlying 
navigable waters to private parties.  On the contrary, the Court recognized that states 
may lawfully, and consistent with the public trust, grant parcels of submerged land to 
private parties.183  This, of course, is consistent with the concepts of jus privatum and 
jus publicum under the public trust doctrine.  Title may be transferred to a private 
party, but the private party’s rights in the property are subordinate to the public rights 
to use the property protected by the public trust doctrine.184  Put another way, a 
transfer of an underlying parcel to a private party that does not impair the public’s 
rights to engage in protected uses of that parcel is appropriate under the public trust 
doctrine.   
What the Court found objectionable as violating the public trust in Illinois 
Central was the state’s transfer to the railroad of such a vast swath of Lake Michigan 
                                                                
181
 Id. at 475-76. 
182
 See Sax, supra note 6, at 477 (criticizing such a view of the public trust doctrine as 
rendering lands unchangeable in use and extraordinarily restraining government in ways 
neither Roman nor English law ever contemplated). 
One might argue that different uses of the shore in the future could be allowed, consistent 
with this view of the public trust doctrine, simply by enlarging the types of uses protected by 
the doctrine.  There is a difference, however, between a use protected by the public trust 
doctrine and a use permitted by the public trust doctrine.  The former requires the state to 
maintain the public’s right to use the land for that protected use; the latter allows the state to 
use (or transfer) the land for some purpose despite adverse impact on the public’s right to use 
the land.  Using the example above, recognizing an aquarium as a protected use would mean 
that the state must allow the public to build an aquarium on the land.  This is different from 
saying that an aquarium is a permissible public purpose and thus the state could allow building 
an aquarium on underlying land without violating the public trust doctrine.  
183
 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 452-56 (1892). 
184
 The Illinois Central Court quoted Hale’s De Jure Maris regarding the concepts of jus 
privatum and jus publicum, and stated that lands underlying navigable waters could be 
transferred subject to the public trust.  Id. at 458. 
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beds under terms that rendered virtually the entire Chicago harbor no longer 
available for use by the public for navigation, fishing, and commerce.185  The Illinois 
Central Court signaled, however, that an alienation of lands underlying navigable 
waters under certain circumstances would not run afoul of the public trust doctrine, 
even though it resulted in an impairment of the public’s rights to use such lands.   
First, the Court gave examples of grants of submerged parcels that did not violate 
the public trust: “grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters that may afford 
foundation for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and 
grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”186  Second, after articulating the general 
rule that the state has an obligation to preserve navigable waters and their underlying 
lands for use by the public and that the state’s control over such lands cannot be 
relinquished by a transfer of the property, the Court specifically recognized 
exceptions to that general rule: “The control of the state for the purposes of the trust 
can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of 
the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”187   
The Supreme Court subsequently has not further specified the circumstances by 
which a state, consistent with the public trust doctrine, could lawfully transfer or 
otherwise alienate land underlying navigable waters in a manner that would impair 
or terminate the public’s right to use such lands and waters.  It is fair to say that 
commentators and lower courts have been less than uniform in determining what 
constitutes such acceptable circumstances.188  Based on the core principles of the 
public trust doctrine, drawn from the teachings of Illinois Central and other cases, I 
propose that the public’s right to engage in uses protected by the public trust doctrine 
                                                                
185
 Id. at 454-56.  The planned use by the railroad of the granted submerged lands 
presumably would have substantially interfered with the public’s continued ability to use the 
waters and lands of Chicago harbor for navigation, fishing, and commerce. 
186
 Id. at 452 (emphasis added). 
187
 Id. at 453 (emphases added).  The Court subsequently repeated the same exceptions:   
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely 
under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels 
mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains . . 
. . 
Id. 
188
 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 28, at 426 (transfer of public property to private party 
requires compensation to the public); Rasband, supra note 10, at 85 (as long as legislative 
intent is clear); Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 461-62 (if the transfer advances navigation or 
does not substantially impair the public’s rights to engage in protected uses).  Professor Sax, in 
an oft-quoted passage, generally outlined the circumstances as follows:  
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, 
a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which 
is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject 
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.  
Sax, supra note 6, at 490. 
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on a parcel underlying the Great Lakes should be permitted to be impaired or 
terminated only under the following circumstances: 
(1)  The legislature’s intent to impair or terminate the public’s right to use the 
land must be clear.  There is a longstanding presumption that a transfer of the jus 
privatum interest in land will not affect the public’s right to continue to use that 
land.189  This presumption is well grounded in the importance of the public’s rights to 
use such land and associated navigable waters.  Hence, the legislature’s intent to 
overcome that well-founded presumption, and impair or terminate the public’s right 
to continue making protected uses of such land, must be clear.190   
(2)  The impairment of public use must not be substantial.  The state has a trust 
obligation to preserve the navigable waters and underlying lands for certain protected 
public uses, and allowing substantial impairment of those public rights would breach 
that trust.191  Whether the impairment is substantial should involve weighing at least 
two considerations.  First, the amount of land impaired or relinquished must not be 
substantial.  Only relatively small parcels of underlying lands can be relinquished 
from protected public use without substantially impairing the rights of the public to 
engage in protected uses.192  Second, the effect of the impairment or termination must 
not be substantial.  In some situations, the termination of even relatively small 
parcels from the geographic scope of the public trust may substantially impair the 
public’s rights, either due to the importance of that parcel to such rights or the effect 
it has on the public’s rights to engage in protected uses of the remaining waters and 
lands.   
(3)  The impairment must advance an important public interest.  The public is the 
beneficiary of the public trust; an impairment of the public’s rights guaranteed by the 
public trust doctrine should only be permitted where it is in the public interest to do 
so.193  There is a split of authority regarding whether the public interests justifying 
impairment of the public’s rights to use underlying land are limited to those which 
advance uses protected by the public trust doctrine or include a broader category of 
public interests.194  On one hand, limiting the public interests to those advancing uses 
protected by the public trust doctrine would, as mentioned above, tend toward 
ossification of the shores.  On the other hand, allowing impairment or termination of 
the public’s rights to make protected uses of underlying lands merely because a 
legislature or judge deems it to be in the public interest could eviscerate the public 
trust doctrine.  For example, the public trust doctrine under this view might allow a 
state to relinquish the important public rights protected by the doctrine in return for 
                                                                
189
 See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (A grant of an 
exclusive fishery will not be presumed “unless clear and especial words are used to denote 
it.”).   
190
 Where the action is taken by a state agency, the delegation of its authority to take such 
action likewise must be clear.  See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 654. 
191
 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-56. 
192
 See id. at 452 (wharves, docks, and piers). 
193
 Id. at 453-56. 
194
 See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 232-33; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 651-53. 
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short-term economic benefits (e.g., increased tax revenue, more jobs) that arguably 
serve a public interest.195   
A better view is that the proposed alienation can be for an important public 
purpose beyond protected uses, but it must primarily benefit the public and relate to 
its location on land underlying navigable waters.  In general, an alienation that 
primarily benefits a private party, or excludes the public from the land, is not 
advancing an important public purpose.196  For instance, transferring land to lure a 
new business to the region may have public benefits, such as increased employment 
opportunities for local residents and enhanced tax revenue, but the primary 
beneficiary of the transfer is the private business, not the public.197  Similarly, 
building a prison may be important to the state, but a prison could be built virtually 
anywhere.  It need not be built adjacent to navigable waters and thus lacks the 
requisite nexus to its location on the underlying land.198   
In sum, a state does have some authority to redefine the geographic scope of the 
lands held in public trust, as Shively and Phillips suggest.  But as Illinois Central 
teaches, the state’s ability to do so is circumscribed by the parameters of the public 
trust doctrine itself.  A state should only be permitted to relinquish lands from the 
scope of the protections afforded by the public trust doctrine where the legislature’s 
intent to do so is clear, where the public’s rights to engage in uses protected by the 
public trust doctrine are not substantially impaired, and where an important public 
interest is promoted.199   
                                                                
195
 See Sax, supra note 6, at 477. 
[I]f the trust in American law implies nothing more than that state authority must be 
exercised consistent with the general police power, then the trust imposes no restraint 
on government beyond that which is implicit in all judicial review of state action—the 
challenged conduct, to be valid, must be exercised for a public purpose and must not 
merely be a gift of public property for a strictly private purpose.  
Id.; see also SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 233. 
196
 Sax, supra note 6, at 490. 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, 
a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which 
is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject 
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.   
Id. 
197
 See People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976).  A narrow 
exception could be recognized, however, for private wharves, piers, docks, and similar 
structures advancing navigation and commerce.  See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452. 
198
 See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 233 (“[A] conveyance of trust lands should be 
related to the lands and waters remaining, not simply any interest that would further the 
general common good of the public.”). 
To avoid permanently relinquishing land from the scope of the public trust, a state could 
choose to lease the land to the private party.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11 (West 
2009) (authorizing the director of natural resources to lease lands underlying Lake Erie).  
Alternatively, a state could impose a requirement that the land, or at least the jus publicum, 
revert to the state once the proposed use deemed to be in the public interest ceases. 
199
 SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 231-35 (suggesting similar criteria for limiting a state’s 
power to convey the jus publicum in public trust lands); but cf. id. at 240-42 (suggesting 
different criteria for terminating the public interest).  
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
34 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1 
Importantly, it should be noted that, consistent with the public trust doctrine, a 
state could redefine “ordinary high water mark” rather than continue to follow the 
common law definition.  For example, a state could redefine OHWM, via legislation 
or authorized regulation, to establish a “brighter line” boundary for the public trust 
along the shore—i.e., one more readily identifiable or ascertainable by the public, 
littoral owners, and the state.200  Examples could include redefining OHWM as a 
specific elevation above sea level or as a particular horizontal distance from the 
water’s edge.   
In redefining the scope of the public trust doctrine, though, the state remains 
bound by the restrictions of the public trust doctrine itself, outlined above.  
Legislatively redefining the boundary of the public trust doctrine to make it more 
readily ascertainable could be viewed as promoting an important public interest, 
because doing so would facilitate public use of the lands and the state’s obligation to 
protect such lands.  As long as the amount of lands and waters subject to the public 
trust would not be substantially diminished, and the public’s rights to make use of 
the lands and waters would not be substantially impaired, the fact that in certain 
areas the new public trust boundary might be set more lakeward than at common law 
should not prevent the state from legislatively redefining the boundary.201   
                                                                
200
 One of the dissent’s key criticisms of the majority opinion in Glass v. Goeckel was that 
the water’s edge is a more readily identifiable boundary than the common law OHWM, which 
“requires littoral property owners and the public to guess” its location.  Glass v. Goeckel, 703 
N.W.2d 58, 102-03 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Similarly, the Merrill court asserted that “[t]he water’s edge provides a readily discernible 
boundary for both the public and littoral landowners.”  State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of 
Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007, 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 128 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
21, 2009). 
201
 The public trust doctrine also serves to restrict the state’s ability to expand its 
geographic scope.  For example, setting the boundary of the public trust doctrine ten miles 
more landward than at common law would be an unreasonable, unlawful interpretation of 
OHWM.  Such a government action would not be protected by the public trust doctrine from a 
takings claim. 
A number of states, including Ohio, have recognized the public’s right to recreationally 
boat on streams that are not navigable-for-title: that is, streams that were not actually 
navigable for commercial purposes at the time of the state’s admission to the Union.  See, e.g., 
Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete 
Co., 336 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).  Typically, the beds of non-navigable streams are 
privately owned and not subject to the public trust doctrine; the riparian owners can exclude 
the public from access to such non-navigable waters and underlying private lands.  See, e.g., 
East Bay Sporting Club v. Miller, 161 N.E. 12 (Ohio 1928).  Some have criticized the 
recognition of the public right to recreationally boat in waters that are not navigable-for-title as 
an unlawful expansion of the public trust doctrine and a taking of private property without just 
compensation.  See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10055-56.  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that such an “expansion” to include streams capable of floating a 
canoe or kayak is in fact a lawful, reasonable re-definition of the term “navigable” for 
purposes of the public trust doctrine.  As the Supreme Court acknowledged in an important 
takings case, background principles of state law can evolve.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (“[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what 
was previously permissible no longer so.”).  The Great Lakes unquestionably are navigable-
for-title.   
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Yet if the state legislature impairs or terminates the jus publicum for a vast swath 
of lands, whether via express legislation or under the guise of redefinition, what will 
empower a court to invalidate the legislative act?  This question, of course, has 
vexed courts and commentators ever since the Illinois Central Court voided the 
legislature’s grant of Lake Michigan beds to the railroad more than a century ago.  
Although the Supreme Court subsequently described Illinois Central as being 
grounded in state law,202 some have argued that the public trust doctrine is rooted in 
the U.S. Constitution.203  Others view the public trust doctrine as a unique species of 
common law, one that cannot be undone by state legislation.204  Today regarding the 
Great Lakes shores, however, arguably the question is more easily answered.  
Virtually all of the Great Lakes states have constitutional provisions pursuant to 
which courts could base decisions to invalidate legislative acts that violate the public 
trust doctrine.205  Some states have specific constitutional provisions aimed at 
protecting natural resources or the environment.206  Other state constitutions repeat 
language from the Northwest Ordinance providing that the Great Lakes and certain 
other navigable waters shall be “common highways and forever free.”207  In Ohio, a 
recent constitutional amendment specifically recognizes the public trust doctrine as it 
applies to Lake Erie and navigable waters of the state.208  Hence, there should be no 
doubt about a court’s power to void state actions that violate the public trust doctrine 
with respect to the shores of the Great Lakes.   
b.  Physical Changes to the Shore  
Like the boundary for title purposes,209 the common law boundary of the public 
trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shore is a movable freehold.  That is, the 
OHWM is not forever fixed as of the date of statehood.  Rather, the OHWM may 
move lakeward due to accretion and lower lake levels and may move landward due 
to erosion and higher lake levels.  This ambulatory boundary ensures that the public 
                                                                
202
 Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). 
203
 See Epstein, supra note 28, at 427-28 (equal protection and due process clauses); 
Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 459 (commerce clause). 
204
 See David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the 
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 715 (2008). 
205
 See Araiza, supra note 28, at 438-51; Klass, supra note 6, at 719, 728-30; see also 
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) 
(legislation relinquishing Arizona’s interests in navigable riverbeds held invalid under the 
common law public trust doctrine and so-called gift clause of the state constitution).  
206
 ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27.   
207
 “The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying 
places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free . . . .”  Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, art. IV, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).  For state constitutions embodying such 
language, see MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
208
 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19(B). 
209
 See supra Part II. 
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retains the rights to use the waters and shores of the Great Lakes, and the littoral 
owner retains her littoral rights, regardless of physical changes to the shore.210   
Sudden avulsive changes to the shore, however, should not result in loss of public 
trust lands.  Neither should artificial changes (e.g., filling submerged lands) deprive 
the public of the right to use lands protected by the public trust.211   
B.  Protected Public Uses 
Not every use of public trust waters and lands is protected by the public trust 
doctrine.  The Supreme Court in Illinois Central instructed that the State of Illinois 
held the waters of Lake Michigan and the underlying land in trust for the public to 
use for navigation, fishing, and commerce.212  Subsequently, navigation, fishing, and 
commerce have come to be viewed as the traditional triad of public trust protected 
uses.213  Some courts have limited protected uses to the traditional triad and uses 
“incidental” to one or more of these triad of uses.  That is, uses incidental to 
navigation, fishing, or commerce are afforded public trust protection, but those that 
are not incidental to one of the triad are not subject to the public trust.214   
But in many jurisdictions uses beyond—and not necessarily incidental to—the 
traditional triad have long been recognized as subject to the protection of the public 
trust doctrine.  Protected uses long recognized by various courts include bathing, 
hunting, ice cutting, and skating.215  In Phillips, the Supreme Court noted that even 
where tidelands are privately owned, “public rights to use the tidelands for the 
                                                                
210
 See Abrams, supra note 35, at 898-902. 
211
 See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 108-17.  Changes in legal status of the shore due to 
adverse possession, prescription, or similar state law principles of property law are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  In general, however, in most states a private party cannot gain title to 
state-owned land via adverse possession or acquire rights to use state-owned lands via 
prescription.  Even where adverse possession or prescription is recognized against the state, 
the dominant jus publicum interest should not be extinguished.  Id. at 238-40; see also Oregon 
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (common law doctrine of custom allows 
public to obtain easement for recreational use of privately owned dry sand ocean beach). 
212
 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
213
 See, e.g., SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 170-71.  At least one commentator has 
disputed that the jus publicum under English common law preserved any public right beyond 
navigation.  See Deveney, supra note 11, at 46-48.  The Nineteenth Century Supreme Court, 
however, clearly viewed the public trust doctrine in England as protecting fishing as well as 
navigation and commerce.  See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894).  As the Twentieth 
Century Supreme Court noted in a related context, “[W]e do not intend to get involved in the 
historical debate over what the English common law was . . . . [O]ur concern is with how that 
law was understood and applied by this Court in its cases.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 478 n.7 (1988).   
214
 See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (public’s rights to use privately 
owned tidelands are limited to fishing, fowling, and navigation, or uses incidental thereto, and 
do not include general recreational uses).  
215
 See, e.g., Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54 (Mich. 1926) (hunting); Lamprey v. 
Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (bathing, skating, ice cutting, etc.). 
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purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing, etc., have long been recognized,” terming them 
“traditional privileges.”216   
Recent decades have seen an increase in the types of uses protected by the public 
trust doctrine in multiple jurisdictions, including the Great Lakes states.  For 
example, recreational boating is now recognized as a protected use in many states.217  
A number of states have employed the public trust doctrine to preserve the scenic, 
ecological, and environmental values of the waters and lands within the geographic 
scope of the public trust.218  Some have criticized this “expansion,” urging that 
forcing private owners to allow “new” uses of their property by the public constitutes 
a physical or regulatory taking of private property without just compensation.219  As 
reflected above, however, protected public trust uses clearly need not be limited to 
navigation, fishing, and commerce.  That triad became protected uses under the 
public trust doctrine because they were the uses of navigable waters important to the 
public during past centuries.  The public trust doctrine is a dynamic doctrine that 
should be able to evolve to protect uses of navigable waters and underlying lands 
that are important for the public today.220   
But just as clearly, there must be some limit on the types of public uses protected 
by the public trust doctrine.  Merely because the land geographically is subject to the 
public trust should not mean that members of the public have an enforceable right to 
make whatever use they want of such land, over the objections of the state or private 
landowner.  Should there be a public right, for example, to use the privately owned 
shore to play beach volleyball? 
While public trust protected uses need not be static, the scope of protected uses 
should be true to the principles of the public trust doctrine.  The public trust doctrine 
balances the need to keep certain lands and waters available for important common 
uses with the rights of the property owner, state or private, to make use of its 
property.221  Just as completely excluding the public from use of such lands and 
                                                                
216
 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483 n.12. 
217
 See, e.g., Lamprey, 53 N.W.1139; Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 
N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); Muench v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952). 
218
 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (environmental and 
ecological values); Muench, 53 N.W.2d 514, 522 (scenic beauty). 
219
 See, e.g., Huffman, Takings Clause, supra note 33. 
220
 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“The public uses to which tidelands are subject are 
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.”); cf. Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of 
Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 730 (Ohio 1948) (refusing to allow “dead hand of the past” to limit 
public trust doctrine, explaining that “the law should be flexible enough to be applied to a 
constantly progressive civilization”).  
221
 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 59-60 (arguing that “[t]he public trust doctrine at its 
core opposes excess” and noting that most major public trust opinions balance the value of 
private property with the protection of public resources). 
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waters would violate the public trust, the balance likewise is violated by opening 
those lands and waters to any and all public uses.222   
Accordingly, to allow states to preserve the balance between evolving public 
needs and the needs of the landowner, I propose the following framework for 
evaluating whether a use should be protected by the public trust doctrine: In addition 
to navigation, fishing, and commerce, and uses incidental thereto, protected uses (a) 
should be sufficiently important as to justify public trust protection, with a nexus to 
the public trust lands or waters, and (b) should not substantially interfere with the 
property rights of the owner in ways beyond what would result from the exercise of 
protected uses already recognized.223  For example, the erection of housing for low 
income persons may be important, but it should not be a protected use because low-
income housing could be located anywhere and such permanent structures would 
cause substantial additional interference with the rights of the littoral owner, 
including her right to access the lake and to use her shore.  Playing beach volleyball 
should not be sufficiently important to the public as to justify public trust protection.   
Walking along the shore of the Great Lakes, between the ordinary high water 
mark and the water’s edge, could easily qualify as a protected public trust use.  First, 
walking can be considered incidental to protected uses such as navigation or 
fishing.224  Second, walking the shore of the Great Lakes is important, bears a close 
nexus to the protected lands and waters, and does not substantially interfere with the 
rights of the littoral owner in ways beyond what results from protected uses now.  
Many courts have long recognized that walking along the ocean shore between the 
                                                                
222
 To the extent that a use is consistent with the public trust doctrine, recognition of the 
public’s right to engage in such use on private property, which is subject to the jus publicum, 
should not constitute a taking.  See supra Part II. 
223
 These factors faintly echo criteria relevant to regulatory takings.  See Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing import of restrictions that background 
principles of state law already place upon the land); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (balancing magnitude of economic impact of regulation, degree of 
interference with investment-backed expectations, and character and purpose of government 
regulation).  But the factors I propose are tailored to the unique setting of lands within the 
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine. 
As Professor Sax has opined, “The central idea of the public trust is preventing the 
destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition 
such as title.  The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public 
expectations against destabilizing changes . . . .”  Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust 
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) (footnote 
omitted). 
224
 In Glass v. Goeckel, both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that walking along 
the shore was a protected use under the public trust doctrine; the only dispute was whether the 
public had a right to walk above the water’s edge, as even the dissenting opinions 
acknowledged the public’s right to walk at or below the water’s edge.  Glass v. Goeckel, 703 
N.W.2d 58, 62, 73-74 (Mich. 2005); id. at 85 n.10 (Markman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting).  Similarly, the Merrill court recognized that walking was a protected use, albeit 
lakeward of the water’s edge.  Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-
L-007, 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009).  But see Bell v. 
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 175 (Me. 1989) (walking is not incidental to fishing, fowling, 
or navigation). 
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ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge is a protected use under the public 
trust doctrine.225  A concomitant right to walk along the shores of our “inland seas” is 
just as important and should be protected by the public trust doctrine as well.  
Although walking can be done almost anywhere, walking along the Great Lakes 
shore offers unparalleled and unique opportunities to enjoy and experience the Great 
Lakes waters and shore that cannot be replicated by walking elsewhere.226  Lastly, 
walking along the Great Lakes shore does not permanently or unreasonably interfere 
with the private rights of the littoral owner.  Persons walking slightly above the 
water’s edge would pose little or no more interference with the owner’s use of the 
shore property, or her littoral rights, than would persons fishing or boating a few feet 
below the water’s edge.227   
V.  APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE GREAT LAKES SHORES 
This part begins by showing that application of my proposed framework 
regarding the public’s right to walk the Great Lakes shores would reach the same 
result in Michigan as did Glass v. Goeckel, albeit by somewhat different means, 
while in Ohio both the means and end would differ from that of the court in Merrill 
v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources.  This part then discusses the remaining 
Great Lakes states.  No reported decision in any other Great Lakes state appears to 
have squarely addressed the public’s right to walk along the shores of the Great 
Lakes.  Most states, however, have a fairly well developed public trust doctrine by 
virtue of case law and, in some instances, statutory and constitutional provisions.  
Utilization of my framework would be consistent with, or at least not inconsistent 
with, existing public trust doctrine in these other Great Lakes states and would, I 
submit, bring a principled approach and salutary results to questions regarding the 
public’s right to use the Great Lakes shores.   
                                                                
225
 See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821) (public right to pass and re-pass 
along the shore); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093, 1097 (N.Y. 1908) 
(public right to pass along the shore between low and high water marks); Caminiti v. Boyle, 
732 P.2d 989, 996 (Wash. 1987) (recognizing that landowners’ docks cannot interfere with the 
public right to pass along the shore); SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 210 (“In nearly all States 
the Public Trust Doctrine provides the public a right to pass and repass over public trust 
tidelands.”).  But see Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (statute providing for 
the public right to use shore up to high water mark for recreation declared unconstitutional 
taking); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (declaring unconstitutional a 
bill that included public right to pass along shore between high and low water lines). 
While “lateral” access along the ocean shores is widely protected by the public trust 
doctrine, a right of “perpendicular” access—i.e., walking perpendicularly to the ocean across 
private property—is seldom protected by the public trust doctrine.  See SLADE ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 210.   
226
 See Abrams, supra note 35, at 861-63 & n.6. 
227
 See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89 (“[T]he public does not interfere with littoral 
property rights when their recognized, individual rights are exercised within the public trust; 
that is, lakeward of the shoreline as defined herein.”).  The public’s right to walk along the 
shore, like all uses protected by the public trust doctrine, is not unfettered and is subject to 
regulation.  See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 75. 
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A.  Michigan 
The Glass v. Goeckel majority opinion in many ways followed the analytical 
framework this Article proposes.  The Michigan Supreme Court examined the 
public’s right to walk along the shore of the Great Lakes by evaluating both the 
public trust doctrine’s geographic scope and the uses it protects.228  The majority 
concluded that the geographic reach of the public trust doctrine for the Great Lakes 
in Michigan extended to the ordinary high water mark and adopted the common law 
definition of OHWM.229  Although Michigan common law had not defined the 
OHWM, the Glass v. Goeckel court looked to Wisconsin case law to hold that the 
OHWM is defined as the point on the shore where the presence and action of the 
water has left a distinct mark.230  The majority adopted the distinction between jus 
privatum and jus publicum, recognizing that the public trust doctrine can extend to 
privately owned land acquired from the sovereign.231   
However, the majority did not expressly look to the equal footing doctrine in 
determining the starting point for the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine.232  
Rather, it looked to earlier Michigan case law and analogized to ocean precedents 
that indicated the public trust should extend to lands submerged on a regular basis.233  
While the grounds relied upon by the Michigan Supreme Court were neither 
incorrect nor unpersuasive, earlier Michigan case law was not directly on point and 
some would argue, as the dissenting justices did, that ocean shores subject to the 
tides are an imperfect analogy to the Great Lakes shores because of the irregular 
nature of lake level fluctuations.234  Per my proposed framework, a court would have 
reasoned as follows: As a matter of federal law, lands underlying the Great Lakes up 
to the ordinary high water mark passed to Michigan in trust when it joined the 
Union, in accordance with the equal footing doctrine; while the state may have 
relinquished title below the OHWM to private parties, the state did not relinquish 
                                                                
228
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 66-75. 
229
 Id. at 69-73. 
230
 Id. at 72 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914) 
(defining OHWM for a river)).  The majority also pointed to R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 
628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001), and Wisconsin v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987), in 
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined OHWM for Lake Superior.  Id.  The majority did 
not address Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923), in which the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that the public did not have a right to walk along the shore of a smaller, navigable 
inland lake above the water’s edge, even though the state owned up to the OHWM.  The 
dissent criticized the majority for “adopt[ing] only a part of the law of that other state, again 
without much explanation as to why it has chosen to adopt only parts of that other state’s law.”  
Id. at 96 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting).   
231
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65-66. 
232
 The court did note that “when the state (or entities that predated our state’s admission 
to the Union) conveyed littoral property to private parties, that property remained subject to 
the public trust.”  Id. at 62.   
233
 Id. at 68-71. 
234
 Id. at 100 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting) (“[W]hile the ‘ordinary high 
water mark’ makes sense in tidal waters, it does not make sense in the nontidal Great Lakes 
because of the irregular nature of lake level fluctuations.”). 
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any portion of the shore below OHWM from the scope of the public trust doctrine; 
and therefore the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine remains at the 
common law OHWM.235   
The Glass v. Goeckel court rejected the argument, voiced by the plaintiff, that the 
Michigan Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act236 had legislatively defined the 
landward boundary of the public trust doctrine.  The statute describes various 
regulatory authorities of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality for 
lands owned or held in trust by the state lakeward of the natural ordinary high water 
mark of the Great Lakes, with each lake’s ordinary high water mark defined as a 
specific elevation above sea level.237  As discussed in Part IV.A.1 above, a state does 
have the power to redefine the geographic boundary of the public trust doctrine, at 
least to some extent.  Here, however, it appears the Michigan Supreme Court 
correctly determined that the legislature had not clearly intended to redefine the 
boundaries of the public trust pursuant to the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act.238   
As the dissenting justices in Glass v. Goeckel legitimately point out, the common 
law ordinary high water mark is not always readily visible or easily determined.239  
Rocky shores, for example, may bear no distinct mark.  Unlike ocean shores where 
twice a day the tides cover the shore to approximately the same point, the levels of 
the Great Lakes vary seasonally within the year, from year to year, and even decade 
to decade.  Annually, the water levels in the lakes are usually highest during the 
summer and lowest during the winter.  But due to a variety of factors, the average 
lake levels may vary from one year to the next by a foot or more, and it is not 
uncommon for average lake levels to remain, compared to normal, relatively high or 
low for several years in a row.240  Thus, it is more difficult to ascertain at what point 
the water’s presence is sufficiently continuous.  Setting the boundary at the water’s 
                                                                
235
 In Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930), the Michigan Supreme Court, reversing 
prior precedent, held that the state did not own shore between the meander line and the water’s 
edge, but rather the private owner held title to the water’s edge.  Id. at 230-31.  As a result, in 
that case the private owner was entitled to land formed through reliction as a riparian right.  
The Hilt case did not establish the boundary of the public trust doctrine as the water’s edge.  
To the extent Hilt indicated that upon admission to the Union, only land below the water’s 
edge passed to Michigan as a matter of federal law, I respectfully contend that the court was in 
error.  More accurately, as described in Part IV.A.1 supra, the state received land up to the 
OHWM as a matter of federal law under the equal footing doctrine, but as a matter of state 
law, Michigan chose to recognize title in the state only up to the water’s edge. 
236
 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.32501-324.32516 (2009). 
237
 Using International Great Lakes Datum of 1955, the statute sets OHWM for Lake 
Superior, 601.5 feet; Lakes Michigan and Huron, 579.8 feet; Lake St. Clair, 574.7 feet; and 
Lake Erie, 571.6 feet.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32502 (2009). 
238
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 67-68. 
239
 Id. at 102-03 & n.47 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
240
 See NOAA GREAT LAKES ENVTL. RESEARCH LAB., MONTHLY BULLETIN OF LAKE 
LEVELS FOR THE GREAT LAKES (Jan. 2009); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES 
COMM’N, LIVING WITH THE LAKES 16-18 (1999).  For example, water levels for Lakes 
Michigan and Huron reached record highs in 1986.  During this decade, lake levels dropped 
through 2007 to near record lows, but they have been climbing the past two years.  NOAA, 
supra. 
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edge does have the virtue of a bright-line rule, readily ascertainable by the public, 
littoral landowners and the state.  But it is important to realize that the advantages of 
such a bright-line boundary come at a high cost: the protection of the Great Lakes 
shores and the public’s rights to use them.  The state, of course, could still regulate 
the littoral owner’s use of the shore above the water’s edge pursuant to its police 
powers.  In the absence of the public trust, however, the public has no right to use 
the privately owned shores.  Perhaps even more importantly, the state has no duty to 
regulate private use of the shores pursuant to its police powers, and without the 
public trust doctrine, the public is left with little recourse where the state fails to 
protect the shores from private or state actions.  If a state considers the common law 
OHWM too indefinite, it can redefine OHWM, subject to the constraints of the 
public trust doctrine, to establish a brighter-line boundary that would still protect the 
shores and guarantee the public’s right to use them (e.g., ten yards horizontally from 
the water’s edge, specific elevation above sea level which could be adjusted every 
few years based on recent data).241   
With respect to uses protected by the public trust, the Glass v. Goeckel majority 
determined that walking was a protected use, primarily because it is necessary to 
walk in order to engage in traditional protected uses such as fishing, hunting, and 
boating for pleasure or commerce.242  Although the dissent limited the geographic 
scope of the public trust doctrine to the water’s edge, the dissent likewise agreed that 
walking was a protected use, if done below the water’s edge.243  The court, however, 
punted on providing guidance for what uses are protected, merely offering a caveat 
that not every use of public trust lands is protected and there is not an unlimited right 
of access to private land below the OHWM.244  As discussed in Part IV.B above, 
additional uses would be protected under my framework if they are important to 
society, closely related to the protected waters and lands, and do not substantially 
interfere with the rights of the littoral owner in ways beyond what previously 
recognized protected uses do.   
B.  Ohio 
The approach of the Ohio court of appeals in Merrill v. Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources in determining the scope of the public trust doctrine along the 
Ohio shores of Lake Erie differed from that of the Michigan Supreme Court, as did 
its result.  Ohio long has recognized that the state owns the waters and beds of Lake 
Erie in trust for its people to use for navigation, fishing, and commerce.245  Ohio 
                                                                
241
 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
242
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 73-75.  The majority noted that Michigan case law had 
recognized that ice cutting and log floating were uses protected by the public trust doctrine, 
too.  Id. at 74 n.25.  Such uses are not necessary to engage in navigation, commerce, or 
fishing, so some other criteria are needed to explain why they are protected by the public trust 
doctrine. 
243
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 100-01 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The parties did not contest that walking was a protected use under the public trust doctrine.  
Id. at 73-74 (majority opinion). 
244
 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 75. 
245
 See Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948); Winous Point 
Shooting Club v. Slaughterbeck, 117 N.E. 162 (Ohio 1917); State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh 
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courts previously, however, had not expressly ruled on the location of the landward 
boundary of the public trust along the Lake Erie shore nor on whether walking the 
shore is a protected use.   
Geographically, the Merrill court essentially equated the scope of the public trust 
doctrine with the lands owned in fee by the state.  That is, according to the court of 
appeals, the landward boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore 
is the same as the title boundary dividing the state-owned lakebed from the privately 
owned uplands.246  No distinction was made between jus privatum and jus publicum 
interests.   
The Merrill court specifically rejected the view that the geographic scope of the 
public trust doctrine was or is linked to the equal footing doctrine or federal law.247  
                                                          
R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916); Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 (1878); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2009). 
246
 Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007, 2008-L008, 2009 
WL 2591758, ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, 127-29 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009).  Perhaps this focus was the 
result of the state’s claim to own up to the OHWM, so that it could require littoral owners to 
lease land below OHWM if they wanted to wharf out, id. ¶ 2, and of the landowners’ claims 
that their ownership extended to the water’s edge or to the low water mark.  Id. ¶¶ 50-52, 94-
95.  The trial court noted, “The parties also appear to agree that, whatever the proper boundary 
is between the public trust territory and the title rights of littoral landowners, that boundary is 
always coterminous and never overlaps.”  Merrill, 2007 WL 491086, ¶ 16 n.9. 
247
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 75-82.  Intervenors National Wildlife Federation and 
Ohio Environmental Council argued that, as a matter of federal law, the landward boundary of 
the public trust along the Lake Erie shore in Ohio must be the ordinary high water mark.  See 
id. ¶ 76.  While my framework provides that the starting point for determining the geographic 
scope of the public trust doctrine along the Ohio shore of Lake Erie is the OHWM as a matter 
of federal law by virtue of the equal footing doctrine, I do not concur that federal law 
mandates that the OHWM is the landward boundary for the public trust today along the Lake 
Erie shore.  See supra Part IV.2. 
The common pleas court in Merrill asserted another reason for finding the equal footing 
doctrine irrelevant to the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine or the dividing line 
between public and private title along the Lake Erie shore.  The trial court reasoned that much 
of the land along Lake Erie did not pass from the federal government to Ohio upon its 
statehood in 1803, because such lands were previously subject to conflicting claims by 
Connecticut, Virginia, and New York.  Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶ 235.  The trial court’s 
reasoning, however, seemingly misconstrued the effects of both the equal footing doctrine, by 
which title to lands underlying navigable waters pass to new states absent a grant or 
reservation by the federal government, see, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 
482 U.S. 193, 195-98 (1987), and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, by which the original 
states relinquished their claims to lands in the Northwest territories, including Ohio, to the 
federal government.  See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch.8, 1 Stat. 50-53 (1789); Rasband, 
supra note 10, at 30-34.  As a result, unless the federal government had expressly authorized 
grants to private parties by the original colonies of lands underlying Lake Erie prior to 1803, 
those lands should have passed to the State of Ohio upon its admission to the Union.  See 
supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
Moreover, the lands underlying navigable waters were subject to the public trust doctrine 
when the original colonies acquired them from the crown.  That is, just as the crown and 
federal government retained jus publicum in such lands when jus privatum was transferred to a 
private party, the original colonies likewise would retain jus publicum if jus privatum were 
transferred to a private party prior to Ohio becoming a state.  Hence, the jus publicum would 
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Rather, the court invoked Shively to assert that state law determines the scope of the 
public trust in land underlying navigable waters such as Lake Erie.248   
The court of appeals then proceeded to try to divine what Ohio law says about the 
scope of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore.  Relying primarily on 
language from a few Ohio Supreme Court decisions and the term “natural shoreline” 
in Ohio Revised Code sections 1506.10 and .11,249 the court concluded that state law 
sets the landward boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore at 
the water’s edge.250  Rejecting the defendants’ argument that the public trust extends 
to the OHWM, the Merrill court stated that the public trust doctrine “cannot be 
improperly extended in violation of littoral property owners’ rights.”251   
I respectfully submit that the Ohio court of appeals erred in Merrill, in assuming 
that the boundary for title must equate with the boundary for the public trust, in 
assuming that the state is free to draw the public trust boundary wherever it chooses, 
and in its analysis of Ohio law.  Rather, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 above, the 
boundary for the public trust doctrine need not be the same as the boundary between 
private littoral property and the state-owned bed of Lake Erie.  The starting point for 
the court’s determination of the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along 
the Lake Erie shore should be the common law ordinary high water mark, because 
the state received the shore in trust up to the OHWM upon statehood.  From that 
point, the court should have analyzed whether the Ohio General Assembly had 
clearly relinquished any land from the scope of the public trust, or clearly redefined 
the boundary of the public trust, in a manner consistent with the core principles of 
the public trust doctrine, as discussed in Part IV.A.2 above.  In my view, as 
discussed below, the Ohio legislature has not done so, and the landward boundary of 
the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore remains the ordinary high water 
mark.   
Preliminarily, it should be emphasized that no Ohio Supreme Court case has 
decided the boundary of the public trust along the Lake Erie shore, as the Merrill 
court itself acknowledged when it described the issue before it as one of first 
impression.252  The court of appeals nevertheless seemed to place considerable 
weight on language from the syllabus of Sloan v. Biemiller,253 decided by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in 1878, which describes the boundary for purposes of a conveyance 
of land bordering Lake Erie as “the line at which the water usually stands when free 
from disturbing causes.”254  As the Merrill court recognized, Sloan had borrowed this 
                                                          
not have been relinquished in the shores of the Great Lakes prior to Ohio statehood, even if the 
original colonies had the authority to make a pre-statehood grant of title to private parties.  See 
Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81 (1884) (holding that even if there had been an express pre-
1803 grant of a parcel under Lake Erie to a private party by Connecticut that was authorized 
by the federal government, the grant was subject to the public’s right to navigate and fish). 
248
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 76-77, 84. 
249
 Id. ¶¶ 58-71, 123-29.  
250
 Id. ¶¶ 127-29. 
251
 Id. ¶ 84. 
252
 Id. ¶ 1. 
253
 Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 (1878). 
254
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 61 (quoting Sloan, 34 Ohio St. 492, 492 (syllabus)). 
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language from an Illinois Supreme Court opinion.255  But the definition of a 
boundary line was not at issue in Sloan.  Rather, the Sloan court held that a littoral 
owner does not have the exclusive right to fish in Lake Erie waters opposite his 
property.  In so holding, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the beds of Lake Erie are 
owned by the state, not littoral owners, and that the public has a right to fish in Lake 
Erie and cannot be excluded from doing so by a littoral owner.256  The Sloan court 
employed the Illinois case to support its ruling that the state, not private littoral 
owners, owned the lands underlying Lake Erie, and the opinion should not be viewed 
as authority for the boundary of the public trust doctrine.257   
                                                                
255
 Sloan, 34 Ohio St. at 512-13 (quoting Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 524-25 (1860)); see 
Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 62-65. 
256
 Sloan, 34 Ohio St. at 514-15. 
257
 As discussed in Part V.C. infra, Seaman v. Smith and its Illinois progeny speak to the 
boundary for title purposes, not for the public trust, and Illinois has not specifically altered the 
boundary for the public trust along Lake Michigan. 
The Merrill court also relied on snippets from two other Ohio Supreme Court cases: a 
sentence in the syllabus of Ohio v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 
1916) saying the state holds title to the “land under the waters of Lake Erie” in trust for the 
public, and language in Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 710, 725 
(Ohio 1948), saying that the state holds title to “the subaqueous soil of Lake Erie” in trust for 
the public and that littoral owners do not have title beyond the “natural shore line” of Lake 
Erie.  Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 125, 126.  Neither case should be viewed as guidance for 
the boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore.  At issue in Cleveland & 
Pittsburgh Railroad was whether the littoral owner was entitled to wharf out to deeper, 
actually navigable water by filling in the submerged state-owned bed of Lake Erie.  Cleveland 
& Pittsburgh R.R., 113 N.E. at 679.  Invoking Shively and Illinois Central, the Cleveland & 
Pittsburgh Railroad court emphasized the importance of the public trust doctrine, but the court 
held that, in the absence of legislation, the littoral owner had a right to wharf out to the harbor 
line, provided he did not interfere with the public rights of navigation and fishing.  Id. at 680-
83.  In Squire, the issue was whether the government had authority to build a road on land that 
had been created by the littoral owner depositing fill on the formerly submerged, state-owned 
bed of Lake Erie.  Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 717-19.  In neither case was Ohio’s high court trying 
to limit the scope of the public trust to lands that are literally under water; there was no dispute 
over the boundary of the public trust in either case, because the fills indisputably had occurred 
on state-owned lakebed.  By reciting that the littoral owner has no title beyond the “natural 
shoreline,” the Squire court was saying that the littoral owner could not acquire title to land 
created artificially by fill.  Id. at 730 (since littoral owner did not own filled land, case turned 
on whether littoral owner had filled land for purposes of wharfing out; if so, government had 
“taken” his littoral right by building a public highway on filled land). 
Contrary to the court of appeals, Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront E. Fifty-Fifth St. Corp., 27 
N.E.2d 485 (Ohio 1940) was not a public trust case and was not describing where the public 
trust territory commenced when it referenced “shoreline.”  See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 
68.  Rather, at issue in Duffy was whether the state or the littoral owner had title to land 
recently formed by accretion.  Duffy, 27 N.E.2d at 485.  The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the private owner, concluding inter alia that the Fleming Act had not altered the 
common law of accretion along Lake Erie.  Id. at 486. 
The court of appeals also pointed to 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-025 (Oct. 27, 
1993), which opined that littoral owners own above the “natural shoreline” of Lake Erie, that 
the “shoreline” is the line marking the edge of a body of water, and that “the shoreline of a 
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The Merrill court also looked to the Fleming Act, now codified at Ohio Revised 
Code sections 1506.10 and .11.258  According to the court, the General Assembly had 
via the Fleming Act in 1917 “codified” the public trust doctrine and defined “the 
state’s rights in Lake Erie.”259  Focusing primarily on the statute’s use of the term 
“natural shoreline,”260 the court invoked the Fleming Act to support its holding that 
the water’s edge serves as the landward boundary of state ownership and the public 
trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie.   
The Fleming Act “declared that the waters of Lake Erie . . . , together with the 
soil beneath and their contents, do now belong and have always, since the 
organization of the state of Ohio, belonged to the state as proprietor in trust for the 
people of the state . . . .”261  Pursuant to the statute, the Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources may lease or permit uses of the land underlying Lake Erie by private 
parties, for purposes of development or improvement, provided doing so does not 
impair the public’s rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing.262   
As discussed in Part IV.A.2 above, it is possible for a legislature to re-define the 
boundary of the public trust doctrine, subject to restrictions imposed by the doctrine 
itself.  However, in my view the Fleming Act should not be interpreted as 
legislatively relinquishing the public trust below the common law OHWM to the 
water’s edge.  First, the Fleming Act does not unambiguously evince legislative 
intent to alter the boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shore 
set by the common law.  The Fleming Act was passed in the wake of Ohio v. 
Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad, where the Ohio Supreme Court in 1916 held that 
the Lake Erie waters and underlying lands were subject to the public trust doctrine, 
but that the railroad had a littoral right to wharf out, provided it did not interfere with 
the public’s rights to use the lake.263  Noting the absence of state legislation 
regulating the littoral owner’s right to wharf out, the court ruled that the railroad 
could wharf out to the harbor line established by the federal government.264  The 
court invited the General Assembly to enact legislation regulating the exercise of the 
                                                          
body of water is in a constant state of change.”  Id. at 5, 7; see Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 
72.  That opinion acknowledged that no case had directly addressed the issue of a littoral 
owner’s title boundary along Lake Erie, 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-025, at 3, and it did 
not purport to address the boundary of the public trust doctrine.  Obviously disagreeing with 
the former attorney general’s opinion, the current Ohio attorney general argued in Merrill that 
the state owns up to the OHWM.  Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 2.  
Lastly, the Merrill court referenced regulations defining “beach,” “shore,” and 
“shoreline.”  OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501-6-10 (E), (T) & (U) (2009).  See Merrill, 2009 WL 
2591758, ¶ 73.  Those regulations were not issued pursuant to the Fleming Act and do not 
indicate that the water’s edge should be the boundary for the public trust. 
258
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11 (West 2009). 
259
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 67. 
260
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11(A). 
261
 Id. § 1506.10. 
262
 Id. § 1506.11. 
263
 Ohio v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916). 
264
 Id. at 682. 
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littoral right to wharf out in Lake Erie, by articulating what littoral owners can 
lawfully do without interfering with the public’s rights protected by the public trust 
doctrine.265  In response, the Ohio legislature enacted the Fleming Act the following 
year.266  By using the term “natural shoreline” in the Fleming Act, the legislature 
seemingly merely intended to assure that formerly submerged lands that had been 
artificially filled would not be excluded from public use and state control.267  The 
statute was not an attempt by the General Assembly to codify all aspects of the 
public trust doctrine in Ohio with respect to Lake Erie and its shores.268   
Second, relinquishing the entire two hundred and sixty-two miles of Ohio shore 
below the OHWM to the water’s edge would seem to violate the substantive tenets 
of the public trust doctrine.  Not only would the loss of such a massive amount of 
shore from public trust protection constitute a substantial impairment to the public’s 
rights to use Lake Erie waters and the lands underlying them, it is difficult to see 
                                                                
265
 The court explained:  
It is to be presumed that the Legislature, in the enactment of legislation on the subject, 
will appropriately provide for the performance by the state of its duty as trustee for the 
purposes stated; that it will determine and define what constitutes an interference with 
public rights, and that it will likewise, in a spirit of justice and equity, provide for the 
protection and exercise of the rights of the shore owners. 
Id. at 683. 
266
 See Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 721 (Ohio 1948); Thomas 
v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). 
267
 Section 1506.10 of the Ohio Revised Code states: 
Any artificial encroachments by public or private littoral owners, which interfere with 
the free flow of commerce in navigable channels, whether in the form of wharves, 
piers, fills or otherwise, beyond the natural shoreline of those waters, not expressly 
authorized by the general assembly . . . shall not be considered as having prejudiced 
the rights of the public in such domain. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (emphases added). 
Similarly, Section 1506.11 provides: “‘Territory,’ as used in this section, means the waters 
and the lands presently underlying the waters of Lake Erie and the lands formerly underlying 
the waters of Lake Erie and now artificially filled, between the natural shoreline and the 
international boundary line with Canada.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11(A) (emphases 
added). 
The trial court in Merrill recognized that artificial filling of the lakebed would not 
diminish lands subject to the public trust and expand littoral property.  Merrill, 2007 WL 
4910860, ¶ 250 (interpreting Ohio Revised Code § 1506.11(A) “territory” as including all 
lands formerly beneath the waters of Lake Erie “notwithstanding any subsequent artificial 
filling of those lands”).  The court of appeals, however, indicated that the actual water’s edge 
is the line between public trust lands underlying Lake Erie “and those natural or filled in lands 
privately held by littoral owners.”  Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 127 (emphasis added).  
Allowing a littoral owner to expand her property—and diminish the public trust lands—by 
depositing fill on the lakebed to create more land above the water’s edge would be contrary to 
Ohio law.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11(A); Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 730. 
268
 Cf. Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 725 (“It is obvious that [the Fleming Act] does not change the 
concept of the declaration of the state’s title as found in the [Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R.] 
case.”);  Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront E. Fifty-Fifth St. Corp., 27 N.E.2d 485, 486 (Ohio 
1940) (“[N]othing in the Fleming Act . . . alters the common-law doctrine of accretion.”). 
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how relinquishing such lands to private littoral owners could promote an important 
public interest.269  Echoing a point made by the dissent in Glass v. Goeckel, the 
Merrill court sought to help justify its holding by asserting that “[t]he water’s edge 
provides a readily discernible boundary for both the public and littoral 
landowners.”270  As discussed in Part V.A above regarding that Michigan case, the 
state can choose to establish a brighter-line boundary, but not at the expense of the 
protection of the Great Lakes shores and the public’s right to use them.   
As a final point with respect to geographic scope, even if the Ohio Supreme 
Court or General Assembly had adopted the water’s edge as the boundary between 
the state-owned bed of Lake Erie and private littoral property for purposes of title, 
the shore of Lake Erie should remain subject to the public trust up to the OHWM.  
Although the state may transfer jus privatum below the OHWM to littoral owners, 
the state retains the jus publicum encompassing the public’s rights to use the shore 
for protected purposes.271  As set forth more fully in Part IV.2.a above, the jus 
publicum can be relinquished only in limited circumstances, where the legislation is 
clear, impairment of the public use is not substantial, and an important public interest 
is advanced.   
Although the court of appeals held that the public has no right to walk the shore 
of Lake Erie on privately owned property above the water’s edge, the Merrill court 
did recognize that the public has a right to walk along the shore below the water’s 
edge.  That is, the court recognized that walking along the shore, albeit below the 
water’s edge, is a public use protected by the public trust doctrine.272  The court 
specifically stated that public walking lakeward of the water’s edge does not 
interfere with the rights of the littoral owner.273   
The Merrill court’s finding that walking the shore of Lake Erie is a protected use 
under the public trust doctrine has a strong foundation in Ohio law.  Both judicially 
and statutorily, Ohio has recognized that the public uses protected by the public trust 
doctrine extend beyond the traditional triad.  Cases hold that recreational boating is a 
protected public use,274 and the Fleming Act provides that the state holds the waters 
                                                                
269
 See Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991) (court invalidated legislation that relinquished state’s claim to riverbeds).  But cf. 
Opinion of Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (colonial ordinance granted oceanfront 
landowners title to low water mark, subject only to public rights of fishing, fowling and 
navigation). 
270
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 128; see Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 102-03 & 
n.47 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
271
 See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 84 (recognizing that “the public trust in Lake Erie 
cannot be abandoned . . . .”).  Although paragraph 6 of the syllabus in Ohio ex rel. Squire v. 
City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 710 (Ohio 1948) recites flatly that the state, as trustee with 
respect to the waters of Lake Erie and underlying land, “cannot abandon the trust property,” 
the opinion cites Illinois Central favorably and should not be viewed as an absolute bar to 
relinquishment of land subject to the public trust doctrine.  Id at 729. 
272
 Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89.   
273
 Id. 
274
 Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 
1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). 
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and underlying lands of Lake Erie in trust “for the public uses to which they may be 
adapted” as well as navigation, commerce, and fishing.275   
In sum, despite the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District 
in Merrill, there is ample support for another Ohio court to hold that the geographic 
scope of the public trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie extends to the 
common law OHWM and that the right to walk along the shore of Lake Erie below 
the OHWM is a protected use in Ohio.   
C.  Illinois   
As early as Illinois Central, Lake Michigan and its beds were recognized as 
being owned by the State of Illinois and held in trust for the benefit of the public.276  
Subsequently, Illinois has statutorily reaffirmed that title to the beds of Lake 
Michigan, and all other meandered lakes in Illinois, are held in trust for the people of 
the state.277   
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has continued to wield the public trust 
doctrine to void legislative grants of land underlying Lake Michigan, as reflected by 
People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District.278  In 1963, the Illinois General 
Assembly passed a bill, signed by the governor, conveying one hundred and ninety-
five acres of land submerged in Lake Michigan near Chicago to the U.S. Steel 
Corporation, which proposed to reclaim the land and build a steel plant, in return for 
a payment of $19,460 by the corporation.279  When U.S. Steel eventually tendered 
payment, it was refused by the state treasurer, and the state attorney general filed suit 
seeking to declare the legislation granting the land to the corporation void.  
Affirming the trial court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the legislative grant 
was void because it violated the public trust doctrine.  Tracing cases involving 
legislative grants of submerged lands under Lake Michigan since Illinois Central, the 
court found only one instance where a legislative grant of submerged land under 
Lake Michigan did not violate the public trust: where the sale of a strip of shore was 
upheld in order to facilitate the extension of Lake Shore Drive over the reclaimed 
land, because the grant did not substantially interfere with navigation, commerce, or 
                                                                
275
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2009); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11(G) 
(recognizing “public right of recreation”); see also Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 729-30 (teaching that 
the “dead hand of the past” should not limit the protections afforded by the public trust 
doctrine to “obsolete and antiquated public uses,” but instead the “law should be flexible 
enough to be applied to a constantly progressive civilization”). 
276
 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892). 
277
 615 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24 (2009).  The beds of actually navigable streams and rivers in 
Illinois, however, can be privately owned.  Illinois follows the so-called English rule as to 
ownership of beds of navigable-in-fact rivers and streams not subject to the ebb and flow of 
tides.  The public has an easement for purposes of navigation in waters that are navigable-in-
fact, regardless of the ownership of the underlying soil, but the riparian owner has the 
exclusive right to fish in the waters covering the soil he owns.  Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783 
(Ill. 1905). 
278
 People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976). 
279
 The Chicago Park District had received an interest in the same parcel by earlier 
legislation, and re-conveyed the land to the state as part of the sale.  Id. at 774. 
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fishing and the benefit to the private interest was incidental.280  By contrast, the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the grant to U.S. Steel primarily benefitted a private 
interest, would irretrievably remove one hundred and ninety-five acres of Lake 
Michigan from public use, and would have an adverse effect on public use of 
adjacent waters.  That the legislature in the bill had articulated that the grant did not 
impair the public interest and that commercially developing the submerged land 
would benefit the people of Illinois was not conclusive.  Likewise, claimed benefits 
to the public of increased local employment and economic improvement were too 
indirect, as virtually every grant of submerged lands arguably could make a similar 
claim.  Quoting Professor Sax, the court stated: “When a state holds a resource 
which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with 
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to 
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.”281   
Neither Illinois cases nor statutes expressly state that the public trust extends 
geographically to the ordinary high water mark along the shores of Lake Michigan.  
The Illinois Supreme Court, though, has recognized that at English common law the 
crown held title to land underlying navigable waters up to the high water mark in 
trust for the people, that the state became vested with such title when admitted to the 
Union pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and that the state holds such lands in 
trust for the people.282   
Case law indicates that, with respect to Lake Michigan, the state’s title extends to 
the water line as it naturally exists free from disturbing causes.283  Although the state 
may have relinquished title to some of the shore below the ordinary high water mark, 
there is no indication that the state has relinquished the public trust for such shore.  
Hence, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along the shore of Lake 
Michigan in Illinois should remain the common law OHWM.   
The U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois Central expressly identified navigation, 
fishing, and commerce as uses protected by the public trust doctrine in the waters 
and beds of Lake Michigan.284  In addition to this traditional triad of protected uses, 
the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that the interests protected by the public 
trust doctrine for Lake Michigan “extend as well to recreational uses, including 
bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”285  No reported Illinois case directly 
discusses the right of the public to walk along the shore of Lake Michigan.  In light 
of the broad recognition of recreational uses and “shore activities” as protected by 
the public trust doctrine in Illinois, though, there should be no barrier to recognizing 
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 People v. Kirk, 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896). 
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 Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 780 (quoting Sax, supra note 6, at 490). 
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 Wilton v. Van Hessen, 94 N.E. 134, 136-37 (Ill. 1911) (holding that non-navigable lake 
was not owned by the state). 
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 Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 130-31 (Ill. 1917); Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525 
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 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
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 Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 780 (quoting Neptune City v. Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-
55 (N.J. 1972)). 
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the public’s right to walk along the shore of Lake Michigan in Illinois below the 
ordinary high water mark.   
D.  Indiana 
In Indiana, the state holds Lake Michigan and its beds in trust for the public.286  
Indiana owns the beds of Lake Michigan up to the “ordinary highwater mark,” which 
is administratively defined as a specific elevation.287  By contrast, for other 
waterways, “ordinary highwater mark” is administratively defined as the “line on the 
shore of a waterway established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by 
physical characteristics,” including the line impressed on the bank, shelving, changes 
in the character of the soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, and the presence or 
absence of debris.288  Various activities by shore owners require a permit below the 
OHWM.289   
Indiana has not expressly addressed the geographic scope of the public trust 
doctrine along its Lake Michigan shore.  Because the state has not, by statute or 
regulation, redefined the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine, the 
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Michigan shore may 
remain the OHWM under common law, rather than the administrative definition.   
Indiana also has not expressly discussed the public uses of Lake Michigan or its 
shores protected by the public trust doctrine.  The state, though, has defined 
protected public trust uses broadly with respect to navigable inland lakes.  
Specifically, a member of the public has a statutory right to walk the lakebed of a 
“public freshwater lake” in Indiana.  The Lakes Preservation Act expressly provides 
that the state holds and controls all public freshwater lakes in trust for the use of 
Indiana citizens, and that the public has the right to use freshwater lakes for 
“recreational purposes,” including fishing, boating, and swimming.290  The Indiana 
court of appeals, interpreting the Lakes Preservation Act, has held that any member 
of the public could “walk in the shallow waters” of a public freshwater lake.291  The 
Lakes Preservation Act, by its terms, does not apply to Lake Michigan.292  However, 
in light of the statutory recognition of recreational uses as among those protected by 
the public trust doctrine in the state, and judicial recognition of walking as being 
within the scope of protected uses, there seems to be no barrier to finding that 
walking along the Great Lakes shores below the OHWM would be a protected use.   
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 Lake Land Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918) 
(preventing foreign corporation from dredging sand and gravel from lakebed). 
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 312 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-1-26(2) (2009) (581.5 feet IGLD 1985). 
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E.  Minnesota 
Minnesota courts repeatedly have recognized a strong public interest in navigable 
waters and the lands underlying them.  The state owns and holds all navigable rivers 
and lakes, and their beds, in trust for “public use,”293 which has been broadly defined 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  In an early case, the court observed that public 
trust uses extended beyond commercial navigation to recreational boating, “fishing, 
fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city 
purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or 
even anticipated.”294  Specifically, with respect to Lake Superior, the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota has recognized uses protected by the public trust include “commercial 
navigation, the drawing of water for various private and public purposes, recreational 
activity, and similar water-connected uses.”295  Although the public trust doctrine is 
broad with respect to navigable waters and underlying lands in Minnesota, it is not 
unlimited.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the state does not have the 
power to take without compensation reclaimed land from Lake Superior for purposes 
of constructing a public highway, because such a public use is not “connected with 
navigation or any other water-connected public use.”296   
The boundary between state-owned beds and privately owned uplands along 
Lake Superior and navigable lakes and rivers is the ordinary low water mark.  But it 
is well settled that the private owner’s title is absolute only to the ordinary high water 
mark.  Between the low and high water marks, the private title is qualified, subject to 
the rights of the public.297  Accordingly, the geographic scope of the public trust 
doctrine along the shores of the Great Lakes in Minnesota extends to the ordinary 
high water mark.   
What constitutes the ordinary high water mark along navigable waters in 
Minnesota has been described both judicially and statutorily.  Courts describe it as a 
water mark, coordinate with the limit of the bed of the water; the “bed” is where the 
water occupies sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation and 
destroy its value for agricultural purposes.  It is determined by examining the beds 
and banks, and ascertaining where the presence and action of the water are so 
common and usual, and so long-continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the 
soil of a bed a character distinct from the banks, in respect to vegetation and the 
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 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 670 (Minn. 1947); 
Nelson v. DeLong, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942); Minnesota v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 
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 State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971). 
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 Id. at 534 (riparian had created new dry land by artificially filling the lakebed of Lake 
Superior out to the point of navigability; state was not permitted to take such new dry land 
without compensation to build public highway). 
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 Id. at 533 (Lake Superior); Mitchell v. City of St. Paul, 31 N.W.2d 46, 49-50 (Minn. 
1948); Korrer, 148 N.W. at 621-22 (dicta about Lake Superior). 
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nature of the soil itself.298  The legislature has defined “ordinary high water level” as 
an elevation delineating the highest water level that has been maintained for a 
sufficient period of time to leave evidence upon the landscape, commonly the point 
where the natural vegetation changes from predominantly aquatic to predominantly 
terrestrial.299   
There appears to be no reported case in Minnesota addressing the right of the 
public to walk along the shore of Lake Superior between the high and low water 
marks.  However, because the public trust doctrine extends to the ordinary high 
water mark and protects a broad range of uses, a court should be free to hold that the 
public has a right to walk along the Minnesota shores of Lake Superior up to the 
ordinary high water mark.   
F.  New York 
Unquestionably, New York law recognizes the public trust in the Atlantic Ocean 
and its shore up to the high water mark, and walking along the seashore between the 
low and high water marks clearly is protected by the public trust.  New York courts 
have upheld the public’s right of passage along the seashore as incident to the 
purposes of navigation, fishing, and bathing.300  Even lounging, pushing a baby 
carriage, and setting up a beach umbrella on the seashore have been protected by the 
public trust.301   
As a general rule, the State of New York holds title to the ocean seashore below 
high water mark, but the state can transfer title to private hands.  Even where the jus 
privatum is privately owned, the shore below high water mark remains subject to the 
jus publicum interest of navigation, fishing, bathing, and other lawful purposes.302  
The legislature is empowered to terminate even the jus publicum interest of small 
portions of protected lands, provided the legislative grant is clear, advances the 
public purpose, and does not substantially impair the public interest.303   
By contrast, the public’s rights to use navigable rivers and streams in New York 
are more limited.  New York in part followed the so-called English common law rule 
with respect to title, and the beds of various non-tidal rivers and lakes that are 
navigable in fact are owned by the riparian landowners rather than the state.304  Even 
so, the public retains the right of navigation on such navigable-in-fact waterways, 
including the incidental privilege to walk on the bed and banks of the river, but only 
when necessary to navigation, including portage onto riparian lands to circumvent 
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Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). 
301
 Tucci v. Salzhauer, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Johnson v. May, 
178 N.Y.S. 742, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). 
302
 Arnold’s Inn, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 547. 
303
 See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526-27 (N.Y. 1916); Saunders v. 
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obstacles.305  However, the public has no right to fish in navigable-in-fact rivers 
where the beds are privately owned, and the owners can exclude the public from 
fishing and other uses not incidental to navigation.306   
New York courts, though, departed from the English rule of title with respect to 
the Great Lakes, major rivers, and large inland lakes, as the beds are owned by the 
state.  New York has recognized that navigable waters and beds of major rivers and 
lakes are held in trust by the state.307   
New York courts have not directly addressed the scope of the public trust 
doctrine as it relates to the shores of the Great Lakes.  In Burnham v. Jones,308 the 
Court of Appeals recognized that the state’s title underlying Lake Ontario extended 
to the high water mark.  Subsequently, however, in Stewart v. Turney,309 the Court of 
Appeals held that the state’s title underlying Cayuga Lake, one of the largest Finger 
Lakes, extended to the low water mark.310  A later decision by an intermediate 
appellate court relied on Stewart to find that the state’s title to the beds of Lake 
Ontario extended only to the low water mark, without citation to or discussion of 
Burnham.311  In Stewart, the court held that persons who walked upon the shore of 
Cayuga Lake above ordinary low water mark were trespassers.  However, there was 
no mention of the public trust doctrine, and the court seemed to equate title with the 
ability to exclude the public.312   
Those cases, however, preceded the enactment of a New York statute defining 
“public trust lands” in a manner that supports the public’s right to walk along the 
shore of the Great Lakes up to the high water mark.  “Public trust lands” are defined 
as: 
those lands below navigable waters, with the upper boundary normally 
being the mean high waterline, or otherwise determined by local custom 
and practice.  Public trust lands, waters, and living resources are held in 
trust by the state or by the trustees of individual towns for the people to 
use for walking, fishing, commerce, navigation, and other recognized uses 
of public trust lands.313   
In short, a robust public trust doctrine exists in New York with respect to the 
ocean and its shores, specifically upholding the right of the public to walk along the 
shore below the high water mark.  The public trust doctrine has been applied to the 
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Great Lakes by New York courts and the legislature.  Notwithstanding an apparent 
split in the case law regarding whether the state’s title to lands underlying the Great 
Lakes extends to the high or low water marks, there is no indication that the state has 
relinquished the jus publicum interest in the Great Lakes shore below the common 
law OHWM, so geographically the public trust doctrine should extend to that 
OHWM.  Given the longstanding rights of the public to walk the ocean shores 
protected by the public trust, and the statutory recognition of walking as a protected 
use, the right to walk should be a protected use along the shores of the Great Lakes 
as well.   
G.  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania rejected the so-called English common law rule governing title to 
non-tidal waters, and the commonwealth owns the beds of rivers and lakes that are 
navigable in fact, not just those that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.  The 
boundary line for title purposes along navigable rivers and lakes is the low water 
mark; the commonwealth holds title below the low water mark, with riparian and 
littoral owners holding title above the low water mark.  But between the low and 
high water marks along navigable waters, the private owner’s title is not absolute.  
Rather, the private owner’s rights are subject to the public’s rights of navigation, 
fishing, and other public trust uses up to the high water mark.314   
Pennsylvania’s appellate courts seemingly have not squarely decided the scope of 
the public trust as it relates to Lake Erie.  At least one trial court, though, has applied 
to Lake Erie the same rules with respect to title and the public trust as followed for 
navigable rivers and lakes.  That is, the littoral owner’s deed was interpreted to make 
the low water mark the boundary between privately owned uplands and state-owned 
beds underlying Lake Erie, but the private owner’s rights up to the high water mark 
were subject to the public’s rights to navigation, fishing, and other unspecified 
protected uses.315  For purposes of regulating fill or encroachments upon submerged 
lands along Lake Erie, the state has administratively defined both the high water 
mark and the low water mark.316   
Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the public’s right to walk along Lake 
Erie.  In general, Pennsylvania recognizes that broad uses are protected by the public 
trust doctrine.  The highest court has stated that public rights in navigable rivers 
include, in addition to navigation and fishing, the rights to gather stones, gravel and 
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 Black v. Am. Int’l Corp., 107 A. 737, 738 (Pa. 1919); Freeland v. Pa. R.R. Co., 47 A. 
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feet IGLD.  25 PA. CODE § 105.3(b) (2009). 
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sand; to take ice and driftwood; and to bathe.317  Statutorily and administratively, 
“recreation” is recognized as a protected public trust use.318  The Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection has published a Public Access Policy 
providing that the public has a right of foot access along the Lake Erie shore in the 
“public easement area” between the ordinary high and low water marks.319   
In sum, Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine extends geographically to the high 
water mark along Lake Erie and protects a broad range of public uses.  While 
Pennsylvania courts have not squarely addressed the public’s right to walk along the 
shore of Lake Erie, there seems to be no barrier to recognition of a public right to 
walk the shore of Lake Erie below the high water mark in Pennsylvania.   
H.  Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the state owns the beds of 
the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark in trust for its people.320  
Wisconsin took title to all navigable waters within the state up to the OHWM when it 
was admitted to the Union, pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, including the 
Great Lakes as well as lesser inland waters.321   
The OHWM has been defined judicially as the point on the bank or shore where 
the presence or action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark, by 
erosion, vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.  Where the bank or 
shore at any particular place is of such character that it is difficult to ascertain such a 
point, recourse to other places on the bank or shore of the same water body is 
appropriate to determine the OHWM.  This same definition of OHWM applies to 
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Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987). 
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Lakes Superior and Michigan, as well as to navigable rivers and other inland lakes in 
Wisconsin.322   
Hence, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin along the 
Great Lakes shores seems clear: the state owns the shore below the OHWM along 
Lakes Superior and Michigan in trust for the people.  But it is far from clear what 
public uses are protected by the public trust doctrine with respect to the state-owned 
shore of the Great Lakes between the OHWM and the water’s edge.   
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1923 held that the public has no right to walk 
along the state-owned shore of a navigable inland lake between the water’s edge and 
the OHWM.  In Doemel v. Jantz,323 the court held liable for trespass a defendant who 
had walked along the shore of Lake Winnebago between the ordinary high and low 
water marks.  Although the shore was owned by the state in trust for the public, the 
court found that the rights of the public to use the shore were limited to those 
incident to navigation.  “The riparian owner’s rights to the shore are exclusive as to 
all the world, excepting only where those rights conflict with the rights of the public 
for navigation purposes.”324  When the water is at the high water mark, the shore 
beneath the water is subject to the rights of the public for navigation purposes.  But 
when the water recedes to the low water mark, the riparian has exclusive rights to 
use the shore up to the OHWM.325   
Although the rule of Doemel v. Jantz apparently has never been applied in a case 
involving the Great Lakes shores, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
charged with enforcing the public trust doctrine, follows Doemel v. Jantz with 
respect to the Great Lakes shores, too.  That is, the littoral owner has the exclusive 
right to use the shores of the Great Lakes below the OHWM and above the water’s 
edge, subject only to the public’s right to navigate.  The WDNR employs a “keep 
your feet wet” policy: the public’s right to walk on the lakebed is limited to below 
the water’s edge.326   
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A decade ago, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Stream Access Law, which 
authorized members of the public to use any exposed shore area of a stream between the 
OHWM and the water’s edge, without the permission of the riparian, to engage in water-
related recreational activity.  1999 Wis. Act 9, § 793t  (repealed 2001).  While popular with 
anglers, canoeists, and kayakers, the statute ignited a firestorm of protest among riparian 
owners.  Two years later, the statute was amended to eliminate the statutory right of the public 
to use the shore of streams and to revert to prior traditional law—the public can use the 
exposed shore area between the OHWM and the water’s edge without permission of the 
riparian only if necessary to bypass an obstruction.  2001 Wis. Act 16, § 1255d-1255v 
(codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.134 (West 2009)) (effective Sept. 1, 2001). 
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In my view, following the Doemel v. Jantz rule with respect to the Great Lakes 
shores in Wisconsin is at odds with the state supreme court’s more recent 
pronouncements regarding the public trust doctrine and the Great Lakes.  In R.W. 
Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin,327 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2001 acknowledged 
that the uses protected by the public trust in Wisconsin originally focused on 
commercial navigation, but public trust uses have been expanded to include purely 
recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and preserving 
scenic beauty.328  Since protected public trust uses in Wisconsin are no longer 
directly tied to navigation, the logic of Doemel v. Jantz no longer holds true.  A 
Wisconsin court should be free to hold that the public has the right to use the shore 
of the Great Lakes below OHWM for the full panoply of public trust uses, including 
walking.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The shores of the Great Lakes need not be a battleground.  This Article proposes 
a uniform analytical framework for use by each Great Lakes state in determining the 
public’s right to use the Great Lakes shores.  Flexible enough to allow each state to 
strike its own balance between the public interest and those of private landowners, 
the proposed framework provides a predictable approach to questions regarding use 
of the Great Lakes shores, grounded in the core principles of the public trust 
doctrine.   
The proposed framework employs a two-prong approach.  First, it determines the 
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine applicable to the shores of the Great 
Lakes.  The starting point is the lands the states acquired in trust when they became 
states, which the Article concludes is the lands underlying the Great Lakes up to the 
ordinary high water mark, a conclusion informed in large measure by the equal 
footing doctrine.  While the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine can be 
changed in each state, the ability to effect change is circumscribed by the principles 
of the public trust doctrine itself.  Second, the framework determines the types of 
uses protected by the public trust doctrine along the shores of the Great Lakes.  
These protected uses should include both traditional uses of navigation, fishing, and 
commerce, and additional uses of the shore that are important to the public today, but 
which do not unreasonably interfere with the rights of littoral owners.   
The proposed framework is consistent with the laws of each Great Lakes state, as 
well as the core principles of the public trust doctrine, and its adoption would bring a 
consistent, well-founded approach to deciding disputes regarding use of the Great 
Lakes shores, including whether and where the public has a right to walk.   
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 R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001). 
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 Id. at 787-88.  The court held that denial of a permit to dredge the state-owned bed of 
Lake Superior was not a regulatory taking of riparian rights, which were subordinate to the 
public trust doctrine.  Id. at 791.  The R.W. Docks court also grounded the public trust doctrine 
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Wisconsin Constitution article IX, § 1.  Id. at 787. 
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